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Abstract
This thesis employs models of homogenous and differentiated products to empirically
investigate the demand for mobile phone services in Sub-Saharan African countries. The
thesis consists of a short introductory chapter, three self-contained empirical chapters,
and a summary chapter.
In Chapter 2, we use survey data conducted in 2011 in eleven countries in Sub-Saharan
African to analyze how the availability of physical infrastructure influences the adoption
of mobile phones and usage of mobile services. The availability of physical service infras-
tructure is approximated by data on nighttime light intensity in the areas in which survey
respondents reside. After controlling for a number of individual and household charac-
teristics including disposable income, we find that adoption of mobile phones is higher in
areas with better physical infrastructure. However, in the group of mobile phone adopters,
the use of mobile phones for mobile financial transactions is negatively influenced by the
level of infrastructure. Mobile phone users who live in areas with poor infrastructure are
more likely to rely on mobile phones to make financial transactions than individuals living
in areas with better infrastructure. On the other hand, the use of mobile phones to access
services such as email, skype, social media networks and Internet browsing is not depen-
dent on the availability of physical infrastructure. Our results support the notion that
mobile phones improve the livelihoods of individuals residing in remote areas by providing
them with access to financial services which are otherwise not available physically.
Chapter 3 examines the effect of mobile number portability (MNP) on own- and cross-
price elasticities. Using quarterly data for 28 mobile operators in seven Sub-Saharan
Africa countries between 2010Q4 to 2014Q4 to estimate a differentiated products demand
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model, we find that MNP increased own-price elasticities of demand in countries that have
implemented the facility. This increase in price elasticities may be a result of a reduction
in switching costs between operators. On average, the introduction of MNP increases
own-price elasticities by 0.47 in absolute value. We compare the level of price elasticities
before and after the implementation of MNP in Ghana and Kenya, which implemented
this policy in the time period of our study. Our results suggest that in Ghana, MNP
increased own-price elasticities by an average of 0.35 in absolute terms from an average
value across firms and over time of -0.74. In Kenya, the introduction of MNP increased
own-price elasticities by an average of 0.21 in absolute terms from a lower average value
across firms and over time of -0.39. However, we find that in Kenya and Ghana the average
own-price elasticities remained small even after the implementation of MNP relative to
other countries without MNP in place. Thus, our results suggest that MNP is not the
ultimate solution for increasing competitiveness within the mobile industry.
While in Chapter 3 we use a product differentiated model of demand, in Chapter 4 we
make assumptions that allow us to use a homogenous model of demand to examine the
effect of regulatory policies on mobile retail prices. Using aggregated quarterly data for
eight African countries for the period 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4, we estimate structural demand
and supply equations. We find that mobile termination rates (MTR) have a significant
positive impact on mobile retail prices. A decline in average MTR of 10% decreases aver-
age mobile retail prices by 2.5%. On the other hand, MNP has an insignificant effect on
price and subscriptions in selected African countries. This may be due to inadequate im-
plementation of MNP, which subsequently lead to low demand for porting numbers. The
average market conduct in the mobile telecommunications industry for selected African
countries can be approximated by Cournot Nash equilibrium.
In Chapter 3 we find price elasticities that are closer to 1 in absolute terms. The price
elasticity, however, is estimated at an average of -0.27 for Sub-Saharan Africa countries
in Chapter 4. We attribute this inconsistency to the different assumptions made in each
chapter.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The roll-out and increasing usage of telecommunications services are important contribu-
tors to economic growth by improving factor productivity of some sectors of the economy
and by creating employment (Bresnahan et al., 1999; Brynjolfsson & Hitt, 2000). For
instance, in 2014, the mobile industry generated 3.8% of global gross domestic product
(GDP), a contribution that amounts to over US$3 trillion of economic value across 236
countries.1 As for developing countries, the sector has also attracted a lot of investments
and facilitated competition within the sector and other sectors of the economy (Atsu et
al., 2014). However, various competition and regulatory authorities express concern about
the lack of effective competition in the mobile telecommunication industry. Limitations
in the amount of spectrum and high network investments tend to make the industry
oligopolistic in nature and susceptible to collusion and the exercise of market power (see
Gruber (2001); Valletti (2003). In addition, consumers of mobile phone services tend
to have high switching costs, which may weaken competition among existing firms and
make successful entry of new firms difficult. Moreover, the increasing demand of mobile
broadband services and scarcity of spectrum has already led to rapid consolidation in
some markets. Hence antitrust regulators are faced with tough choices as they balance
their mandate of attaining healthy competition with the financial imperatives facing the
industry.
To improve access and usage of mobile phone services and to ensure that customers
are not exploited, regulatory authorities worldwide introduced mobile number portability
1see, www.gsmamobileeconomy.com
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(MNP), a facility that allows consumers to retain their mobile phone numbers when
changing mobile operator. At the same time, regulatory authorities, such as the Botswana
Communication Regulatory Authority (BOCRA) and Kenya Competition Commission
(KCC), have adopted a glide path for reducing mobile termination rates (MTRs). This
policy requires operators to reduce the charges they set for terminating calls on each
other’s network over time. 2
We are not aware of any economic literature that provides an assessment of the im-
pact of the mentioned regulatory policies on price and own-price elasticities in African
countries. Moreover, in spite of the importance of mobile phone usage in daily life, there
is limited literature on the impact of mobile phone services such as mobile banking, mo-
bile health and mobile agriculture on the wellbeing of population in developing countries.
This thesis breaks new ground by analyzing the determinants of mobile phone adoption
and investigating the effects of regulatory policies on market outcomes for selected Sub-
Saharan African countries. Specifically, the thesis contributes to economic literature by
addressing the following objectives. Firstly, the thesis analyzes how the availability of
physical infrastructure influences the adoption of mobile phones and usage of mobile ser-
vices. Secondly, it assesses the effect of MNP on own- and cross-price elasticities. Finally,
it examines the effect of MNP and MTRs on mobile retail prices. These objectives are
common themes in the three empirical chapters of the thesis.
Chapter 2 uses unique survey data conducted in 11 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa
in 2011 by Research ICT Africa to analyze how the availability of physical infrastructure
influences adoption of mobile phone services, such as M-Pesa, mobile banking and mobile
agriculture. The availability of physical service infrastructure such as banks, hospitals
and agricultural markets, is approximated by data on nighttime light intensity in the
areas in which survey respondents reside. Chapter 3 assesses the effect of MNP on own-
and cross-price elasticities using a unique quarterly dataset for 27 firms in seven African
countries running from 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4. Chapter 4 uses aggregated price and quantity
data for eight African countries for the period 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4 to examine the effect
of regulatory policies on mobile retail prices. The main sources of data for Chapter 3 and
2MTRs refer to the charges which are set by operators for terminating on each other’s networks. Each
network is a de facto monopoly for termination of calls, which can be a source of collusion.
2
4 are Research ICT Africa (RIA) and the World Cellular Information Services (WCIS).
The thesis draws from several strands of literature. Chapter 2 draws on the litera-
ture that analyzes the diffusion process of telecommunication services, such as M-Pesa
and mobile banking (see Mbiti & Weil (2011); Gutierrez & Singh (2013); Economides &
Jeziorski (2014)). However, due to the scarcity of individual-level data on the usage of
mobile banking and mobile money, these studies tend to use aggregated data. The use of
aggregated data cannot answer the question posed in this chapter, since this type of data
is generally silent about the geographical circumstances of mobile phone users. Hence,
we add to this literature by constructing a unique data set that consists of individual
characteristics and information on the level of infrastructure for each respondent. After
controlling for a number of individual and household characteristics including disposable
income, we find that adoption of mobile phones is higher in areas with better physical
infrastructure. However, in the group of mobile phone adopters, the use of mobile phones
for mobile financial transactions is negatively influenced by the level of infrastructure.
Mobile phone users who live in areas with poor infrastructure are more likely to rely on
mobile phones to make financial transactions than individuals living in areas with bet-
ter infrastructure. On the other hand, the use of mobile phones to access services, such
as email, Skype, social media networks and Internet browsing, is not dependent on the
availability of physical infrastructure. Our results support the notion that mobile phones
improve the well-being of individuals residing in remote areas by providing them with
access to financial services which are otherwise not available physically.
Chapter 3 is concerned with literature that estimate own- and cross-price elasticities.
Even though the mobile telecommunication industry is characterized by switching costs,
we are not aware of any research that control for factors influencing switching costs when
estimating price elasticities of demand. In this thesis, we consider MNP as a policy that
reduces switching costs and we assess its impact on own- and cross-price elasticities. We
use quarterly data for 28 mobile operators in 7 Sub-Saharan Africa countries between
2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4 to estimate a differentiated products demand model. Our results
suggest that MNP increased own-price elasticities of demand in countries that have im-
plemented the facility. This increase in price elasticities may be the result of a reduction
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in switching costs between operators. On average, the introduction of MNP increases
own-price elasticities by 0.47 in absolute value. We compare the level of price elasticities
before and after the implementation of MNP in Ghana and Kenya, which implemented
this policy in the time period of our study. Our results suggest that in Ghana, MNP
increased own-price elasticities by an average of 0.35 in absolute terms from an average of
-0.74. In Kenya, the introduction of MNP increased own-price elasticities by an average of
0.21 in absolute terms from a lower average of -0.39. However, we find that in Kenya and
Ghana, relative to other countries without MNP in place, the average own-price elastici-
ties remained small even after the implementation of MNP. Thus, our results suggest that
MNP is not an ultimate solution for increasing competition within the mobile industry.
Generally, operator own-price elasticities are high in all the sampled countries except for
Ghana and Kenya.
Lastly, Chapter 4 deals with literature that analyzes the impact of regulatory policies
on market outcomes. There is a growing debate on the impact of MTRs and MNP on
mobile retail price. The debates on MTRs were largely sparked by Genakos & Valletti
(2011) who conclude that a reduction in mobile-to-fixed termination rates is likely to
lead to an increase in mobile retail prices, a phenomenon commonly known as waterbed
effect. The waterbed effect theory suggests that, in two-sided market, when prices in
one market are pushed down by regulatory controls, the prices in the unregulated market
will increase towards monopoly prices. This holds when demand or marginal costs are
interdependent; firms use non-linear pricing or there is a zero-profit constraint (see Schiff
(2008)). However, in a later study the same authors found no waterbed in the mobile
telecommunication industry. Moreover, this chapter relates to the literature that assesses
the impact of MNP on mobile retail prices. There is a consensus in the literature that MNP
lowers mobile retail prices (see Cho et al. (2013)). However, the existing literature on the
impact of MNP on mobile retail price does not provide evidence on how this regulatory
policy affects mobile retail price. Furthermore, studies that evaluate the impact of MNP
on price only consider demand factors and do not control for supply side effects. We add
to this literature by considering both supply and demand factors effects on price. We
assume that MNP affects the demand side while MTRs affect the supply side.
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We estimate a structural model of demand and supply using quarterly time series data
between 2010:Q4 and 2014:Q4 for eight African countries. On the supply side, we find
that MTRs have a significant and positive impact on mobile retail prices. On average, a
10% increase (decrease) in MTRs will result in 2.5% increase (fall) in prices. This result
opposes the waterbed effect theory, which was tested for telecommunications markets by
Genakos & Valletti (2011). Thus, pushing down the price in the regulated market, that
is, the termination rate, does not increase unregulated mobile retail prices in the group
of countries used in this analysis. This result supports the glide path termination rate
policy.3 Moreover, we do not find that MNP has a significant negative impact on retail
prices for selected African countries, which contrast with the results found by Grzybowski
(2005), Park (2011) and Cho et al. (2013) for European countries. This may be due
to less effective implementation of MNP in African countries and consequently lower
attractiveness and take up of this option by consumers. For instance, even though it
has been found that the effectiveness of MNP depends on porting time and charges, the
porting process in Africa is characterized by long porting time. Furthermore, in some
countries such as Nigeria, subscribers are not allowed to port again for the next three
months.
On the demand side, we find that MNP does not change the responsiveness of con-
sumers to price, a result which coincides with our findings on the supply side. This may
be due to the fact that in many African countries, it is common to use multiple subscriber
identity module (SIM) cards.4 A household survey conducted by ResearchICTAfrica in
different African countries in 2008, reports that 36.3% of adult mobile phone subscribers
hold more than one SIM card in Benin, 25.8% in Kenya and only 2.9% in Mozambique
(see ResearchICTAfrica (2008)). Hence, many consumers are connected to two or more
operators with low demand for porting numbers. We estimate the price elasticity of de-
mand to be on average -0.27. We use the estimate of price elasticity to approximate
3Glide path termination rates policy is a policy that requires network operators to reduce charges
that they charge each other for completing or terminating calls on each network, commonly known as
termination rates.
4Although in Botswana the population is estimated to be around 2 million, the number of active SIM
cards is about 3.5 million. For statistics on active SIM cards see www.itu.int. Popular use of multiple
SIM cards from different operators has delayed implementation of MNP, with the authority not convinced
of the facility’s economic benefits (see www.budde.com.au)
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the average market conduct parameter in selected African countries, which takes value
of 1.29. Thus, the average market conduct in the mobile telecommunication industry for
the selected Sub-Saharan African countries can be approximated by static Cournot Nash
equilibrium.
Future research should examine the impact of the discussed regulatory policies on
prices and quantities using firm-level data. An analysis which is expected to guide com-
petition and regulatory policies for markets that have operators that are asymmetric in
size. Moreover, investigation of the existence of switching costs in the presence of multiple
subscriber identity module (SIM) card is vital.
The remainder of this thesis is as follows. Chapter 2 analyzes how the availability of
physical infrastructure influences the adoption of mobile phones and mobile financial ser-
vices in developing countries. Chapter 3 examines the effect of mobile number portability
(MNP) on own- and cross-price elasticities. Chapter 4 assesses the effect of regulatory
policies on mobile retail prices and Chapter 5 concludes by giving a brief summary and
outlining the implications for future research.
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Chapter 2
Infrastructure Deficiencies and
Adoption of Mobile Money in
Sub-Saharan Africa
2.1 Introduction
The deployment of mobile telecommunications allows developing countries to overcome
poor or non-existent fixed-line infrastructure and lack of Internet access. These are key
burdens to economic growth in these countries. Access to mobile telecommunications
can dramatically improve standard of living in these countries by saving wasted trips,
providing information about prices or serving as a conduit to banking, health care and
other services. Aker & Mbiti (2010) identify a few potential mechanisms through which
mobile phones can provide economic benefits to consumers and producers in developing
countries. First, mobile phones can increase market efficiency by improving access to
information and reducing search costs. Second, better communication can improve man-
agement of supplies and increase productive efficiency of firms. Third, mobile phones
facilitate services which are in general not available to low income households, such as
mobile phone-based financial, agricultural, health, and educational services. In this chap-
ter, we focus on the third point and analyze how the availability of physical infrastructure
influences the adoption of mobile phones and the use of mobile phone services such as
mobile money.
As of 2014, mobile-cellular penetration in low income countries reached 90%. 1 This
1see http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Statistics/Documents/facts/ICTFactsFigures2014-e.pdf
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contrasts with high income countries which have a penetration rate of 121%. At the
same time, in low income countries, only about 54% of the population have a bank
account, compared to 94% in high income countries (see www.worldbank.org). The main
reasons for lack of access to financial services are deficient infrastructure, inaccessibility
and financial illiteracy. Mobile phones can change this situation by enabling people to
make use of financial services overcoming the problem of poor physical infrastructure.
Mobile banking or m-money provides access to account balances and money transfers using
mobile networks, which does not require the proximity of other physical infrastructure.2
In this way, the expansion of mobile banking may have a significant impact on economic
growth and poverty reduction in low income countries.
To date, there is a limited body of literature on the adoption of mobile financial ser-
vices in low income countries.3 This is largely due to the shortage of individual-level data
on the use of mobile banking in low income countries. Aggregate country-level data is
unfit for this purpose because of short time span since the availability of mobile banking
and low level of adoption in the majority of countries world-wide. Among few available
studies, Mbiti & Weil (2011) use two waves of individual-level data in Kenya to analyze
the use of M-Pesa. They find that the use of M-Pesa lowers the propensity of people to
use informal savings mechanisms, but raises their probability of being banked. Gutier-
rez & Singh (2013) use data on 37,000 individuals from 35 countries to analyze factors
which determine mobile banking usage. They construct a regulatory index and find that
a supporting regulatory framework is associated with a higher use of mobile banking for
the general population as well as for the unbanked. They conclude that regulators can
foster the development of mobile banking services through the enactment of support-
ing regulation. In another paper, Economides & Jeziorski (2014) use mobile financial
transactions among subscribers of a major mobile phone service provider in Tanzania
to estimate price elasticities for different types of transactions. They find that demand
2For instance, one of the main South African banks, Standard Bank, as of 2012 operated about 10,000
so-called bank shops in townships with predominantly black residents. These bank shops have a mobile
phone banking capability allowing clients to effect money transfers. They enable hawkers, who usually
close shops in the evening when banks are already closed, to use the bank shops to deposit their money.
3The empirical literature focused on the adoption of mobile phones is already mature. For instance,
Grzybowski (2015) analyzes adoption of mobile phones using panel data of South African households.
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for long-distance transfers is less elastic than for short-distance transfers, which suggests
that mobile networks actively compete with traditional cash transportation systems in
addition to competing with each other.
There is also emerging literature on the impact of mobile phones on the wellbeing of
people. For instance, Jensen (2007) uses data on fishermen in the Indian state of Kerala to
show that usage of mobile phones may improve market performance and increase welfare.
In another paper, Aker (2008) analyzes how the phasing-in of mobile phone coverage
between 2001 and 2006 affected grain prices in Niger. Klonner et al. (2010) analyse the
effect of mobile phone coverage on rural labor market outcomes in South Africa.
Our study contributes to this growing literature by analyzing how the availability
of physical infrastructure influences the adoption of mobile phones and mobile financial
services. We estimate a number of logit models using a households and individuals survey
of telecommunications use and access from eleven Sub-Saharan African countries, which
was conducted in 2011 by ICT Research Africa.4 The survey data is complemented
with the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Open Linear Scanner (DMSP/OLS)
nighttime light intensity data, which we use to approximate the availability of service
infrastructure at the location of survey respondents. The use of nighttime light intensity
data enables us to analyze how spatial differences in infrastructure development across
Sub-Saharan Africa influence the adoption of mobile phones and use of mobile services
by individuals.
After controlling for a number of individual and household characteristics including
disposable income, we find that adoption of mobile phones is higher in areas with better
physical infrastructure. However, the estimation results suggest that, in the group of
mobile phone adopters, the use of mobile phones for financial transactions is negatively
influenced by the level of infrastructure development. Individuals who live in areas with
poor infrastructure are more likely to use mobile phones to make financial transactions
than individuals living in areas with better infrastructure. On the other hand, in the
4Research ICT Africa conducts research on ICT policy and regulation that facilitates evidence-based
and informed policy making for improved access, use and application of ICT for social development and
economic growth. The organization collects survey data on ICT access and use across African countries.see
http://www.researchictafrica.net
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group of mobile phone adopters, the use of mobile phones to access services, such as email,
skype, social media networks and Internet browsing, does not depend on the availability
of physical infrastructure. Our results support the notion that mobile phones improve
the livelihood of individuals who reside in remote areas by providing them with access to
services which are otherwise not available physically. Moreover, we find that all income
groups equally benefit from mobile financial services.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 we discuss the
evolution of the mobile phone industry in Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 2.3 discusses the
data sets used in the chapter. Section 2.4 introduces the econometric model and Section
2.5 presents the estimation results. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Mobile Telecommunications in Sub-Saharan Africa
Mobile services have become affordable to a broader group of consumers in low income
countries with the introduction of prepaid services. Before that, most individuals, and
especially those living in remote areas, did not have access to any telecommunications
services at all.
Due to a poor fixed-line infrastructure, Sub-Saharan Africa almost completely skipped
the era of fixed-line telecommunications and embraced mobile telecommunications for the
use of both voice and Internet services. By the end of 2014, there were 600 million mobile
phone subscribers in Africa. This represents a penetration rate of about 68%.5
Figure 1, Panel 1 shows the total number of mobile phone and fixed-line subscribers
in the 11 surveyed countries in years 2000-2014 and Panel 2 shows the subscription rates
per country. The number of mobile phone subscriptions has grown exponentially, from 9.3
million in 2000 to 396.3 million in 2014. This represents a growth rate of 41.5% over the
period of 14 years. As of the end of 2014, there were in total about 396 million active SIM
cards in the countries of interest. In 2014, Botswana had the highest subscription rate
with about 167 SIM cards per 100 inhabitants. Other countries with high subscription
rates are South Africa (150), Ghana (115) and Namibia (114). On the opposite end, the
subscription rate in Ethiopia stood at 32 SIM cards per 100 inhabitants. At the same
5www.gsma.com
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time, the number of fixed-line connections in Africa stagnated, growing from about 6.8
million in 2000 to 7.8 million in 2014, which represents a growth rate of only 12% in the
period of 14 years.6
Figure 2.1: Aggregated and Country Level Mobile Phone Subscriptions For The Sub-
Saharan Countries
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Panel 2: Mobile country level subscription rates
Many mobile phone users in Africa live in remote areas where there is inadequate access
to financial services, health services and educational programs.7 The evolution of mobile
networks coupled with advances in mobile technologies has led to the emergence of various
initiatives which rely on mobile phones to provide financial, health care, agricultural and
other services. However, increased demand for mobile phone services and broadband
Internet puts pressure on the current network capacity. To ease pressure on their, networks
most operators in Africa are now connected to fiber optics cables and are migrating from
the 3G to the 4G/LTE networks.
6Own calculation from ITU mobile phone subscriptions data.
7To achieve universal access to mobile services, some countries such as Botswana introduced infras-
tructure sharing policy. This initiative of sharing towers reduced the cost of network development and
made it possible for mobile network operators to connect to areas which were initially deemed unprof-
itable.
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In 2008, a number of mobile phone operators in Africa started to deploy the 3G
networks based on the UMTS/HSDPA and W-CDMA technologies. The introduction
of the 3G networks increased Africa’s Internet connectivity which was very low in most
of the countries. A number of mobile operators on the continent are already deploying
fourth generation mobile networks (4G) which enable high speed Internet access. These
networks allow users to browse the Internet, engage in mobile commerce, receive and send
emails and connect with friends on various social media networks.
2.2.1 Mobile Money
Mobile phone services are defined as the use of mobile phones to remotely access services
which are typically provided over the counter. In particular, we analyze the determinants
of usage of: (i) mobile money and (ii) mobile social and Internet activities.
The provision of financial services on the mobile phone, generally called mobile bank-
ing, enables consumers to use mobile phones to access bank accounts, transfer money,
make payments and perform other financial operations. A mobile phone can serve as
a virtual bank card, a point of sale terminal, an automated teller machine (ATM) and
an Internet banking terminal which provides immediate access to accounts and enables
transfers remotely. The services may be provided by a particular financial institution as
an extension of its existing electronic banking services, or independently by a telecommu-
nications provider. Alternatively, financial institutions and telecommunications providers
may establish a partnership to provide mobile banking services (see Brown et al. (2003);
Kim et al. (2009)).
The most common form of mobile banking in Sub-Saharan Africa is the M-Pesa, which
is a mobile money transfer and micro financing service launched in 2007 by Vodafone in
Kenya for the operators Safaricom and Vodacom. It enables users to transfer or cash-in
money using a mobile account (referred to as wallet) that is linked to a unique mobile
phone number of a subscriber. It also allows accessing a wide range of services such as
domestic and international money transactions, payments for bills, flights, hotels, and
airtime top-up (see Morawczynski & Miscione (2008)).
M-Pesa is most common in Eastern African countries, such as Kenya, Uganda and
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Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi, but it has also expanded to other African countries
such as Cote d’lvore, Senegal, Madagascar, Mali, Niger, Botswana, Cameroon and South
Africa. Outside of Africa, M-Pesa operates in Afghanistan, Jordan and other countries.
In Botswana, it is rolled out by two operators Orange Botswana (Orange Money) and
Mascom Wireless (MyZaka) and it enables VISA card payments and automated teller
machine (ATM) cash withdrawals. A number of banks in Africa have also rolled out a
similar service called e-wallet. E-wallet differs from M-Pesa in that it requires the sender
to have a bank account even though the receiver can only withdraw cash at an ATM using
their mobile phone number and a personal identification number (PIN), which is sent to
their mobile phone.8 The introduction of smartphones in recent years has allowed banks
to launch mobile services that complement over the counter and Internet services.
2.3 Data
We combine two data sets to analyze the impact of infrastructure deficiencies on the
use of mobile services. The first database includes a set of representative individual and
household surveys which were conducted by Research ICT Africa in 2011 in the following
11 countries: Botswana, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria, Rwanda,
South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda. The survey data includes individual and household-
level information on fixed, mobile and Internet access and use.9 Table 2.1 shows the
number of individuals surveyed in each country and the share of mobile phone users.
Out of the total number of 13,814 survey respondents there are 8,829 respondents who
declared having a mobile phone.10
8see www.bocra.org.bw
9The survey was also conducted in Mozambique. The data for Mozambique was not made
available to us. For details on the representativeness, sampling and data collection procedures see
http://www.researchictafrica.net.
10The initial sample size is 13,877, but 63 observations were dropped during data cleaning.
13
Table 2.1: Usage of mobile phones
Country Full sample Restricted sample
% mobile obs. % mobile obs. % of full
Botswana 84% 893 85% 824 92%
Cameroon 53% 1199 66% 839 70%
Ethiopia 36% 1608 45% 600 37%
Ghana 61% 1203 69% 809 67%
Kenya 70% 1239 72% 1162 94%
Namibia 66% 955 69% 746 78%
Nigeria 68% 1552 70% 1271 82%
Rwanda 32% 1200 54% 336 28%
South Africa 85% 1588 86% 1326 84%
Tanzania 47% 1177 56% 841 71%
Uganda 61% 1200 64% 912 76%
Total 60% 13814 69% 9666 70%
Notes: Restricted sample includes observations on individuals for which night light
data was available.
The second database is Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Line
Scanner (DMSP/OLS) nighttime lights time series from the National Oceanic and At-
mospheric Administration/National Geophysical Data Center (NOAA/NGDC).11 We use
information on nighttime light intensity for the year 2011 in which the survey data was
collected. Nighttime light intensity is measured on a continuous scale from 1-63 pixel at
a resolution of approximately 1 square kilometre.12
Google Maps was used to generate coordinates for the 405 districts in 11 countries
in which the survey respondents reside. Nighttime lights data was then extracted using
these coordinates and merged with the survey database. Figure 2 shows the 2011 night-
time light intensity on the African continent. The lines on the map divide Africa into
different countries using border line coordinates. The line shows countries where night
light intensity data was extracted for the purpose of this analysis. Unfortunately, we
11The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program Operational Line Scanner (DMSP/OLS) was originally
used to detect the global distribution of clouds and cloud top temperatures in the early 1970s. Since the
establishment of a digital archive in 1992 by the NOAA/NGDC, these nighttime data have been widely
exploited by the scientific community, for instance, in economic applications to approximate economic
growth and development (see Ghosh et al. (2010); Henderson et al. (2011); Ma et al. (2012))
12The extracted data ranges between 0 and 63 but zero measures imply the background, which is thus
replaced by missing values. For details on the data see http://www.ngdc.noaa.gov
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information on nighttime light intensity is only available for 275 areas out of 405.
Figure 2.2: Nighttime light intensity
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The survey respondents are associated with 91 rural and 174 urban areas for which
nighttime light intensity data is available. Table 2.2 shows the mean and standard devia-
tion of light intensity across different countries in rural and urban areas. As anticipated,
the urban areas are more lit in the night than rural areas. There are significant differences
in night light intensity across countries.
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Table 2.2: Night light intensity by country and type of area
Country Rural Urban
Mean(std) No. of areas Mean(std) No. of areas
Botswana 21.0 8 45.1 8
(20.8) (13.2)
Cameroon 11.8 4 38.7 19
(10.4) (25.6)
Ethiopia 14.0 2 34.9 17
(12.7) (22.1)
Ghana 15.1 9 32.1 19
(19.5) (24.2)
Kenya 12.6 9 19.9 15
(7.9) (19.7)
Namibia 15.0 14 36.0 23
(14.0) (22.5)
Nigeria 20.0 20 34.9 29
(23.0) (23.2)
Rwanda 7.0 1 7.3 4
(0.0) (1.3)
South Africa 33.3 11 41.6 19
(26.2) (22.5)
Tanzania 11.3 4 20.7 15
(4.3) (16.8)
Uganda 11.8 9 23.3 6
(5.1) (18.8)
We analyze individuals’ decision to adopt mobile phone and to use mobile services
in the following areas: (i) mobile money, (ii) mobile transfers and (iii) mobile social and
Internet activities. Table 2.3 shows the percentage of mobile phone owners which use
each of these services. The variable ‘Mobile money’ is defined as 0-1 variable based on the
answers to the following question: “Do you ever use your mobile phone to send or receive
money (Mpesa, mobipay)?”, while ‘mobile transfer’ is constructed from answers to the
following question: “Do you use mobile phone for sending or receiving money?” Overall,
18% of mobile phone adopters use mobile money with large differences across countries.
Kenya has the highest share of mobile money users (81%) followed by Tanzania (46%)
and Uganda (39%). The high level of adoption of mobile banking in these countries can
be attributed to the widespread use of M-Pesa. The adoption of mobile money in the
remaining countries is below 10% with the exception of 14% in Botswana. The use of
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mobile transfers is a bit higher (on average 21%) with a similar pattern across countries.
Table 2.3: Usage of mobile services (by mobile phone users)
Country Full sample Restricted sample
Social Money Transfer Obs. Social Money Transfer Obs.
Botswana 28% 14% 17% 751 29% 14% 18% 701
Cameroon 14% 1% 5% 640 14% 1% 5% 552
Ethiopia 12% 0% 0% 580 17% 0% 1% 270
Ghana 17% 2% 2% 735 18% 2% 2% 562
Kenya 31% 81% 80% 871 32% 81% 80% 832
Namibia 34% 7% 9% 632 36% 7% 9% 513
Nigeria 26% 1% 6% 1058 26% 1% 6% 891
Rwanda 21% 9% 17% 386 29% 10% 22% 181
South Africa 32% 5% 8% 1349 34% 5% 9% 1141
Tanzania 19% 46% 48% 555 21% 50% 52% 471
Uganda 18% 39% 42% 735 18% 41% 44% 588
Total 24% 18% 21% 8292 26% 21% 23% 6702
Notes: Statistics is provided for users of mobile phones only. Restricted sample includes
observations on individuals for which night light data was available. Social is defined as usage
of mobile social and communications services. Money is defined as usage of mobile money and
transfer as use of mobile phones for money transfer.
‘Mobile social’ variable in our study is defined as 0-1 variables when survey respondents
confirmed using mobile phones for the following activities: (i) Browsing the Internet; (ii)
Reading and writing emails; (iii) Facebook, Twitter, Mixit or other social networking; (iv)
Skype / Voice over IP. On average 24% of survey respondents having a mobile phone use
‘mobile social’ services. The distribution is more even across countries with the highest
share of users in Namibia (34%) followed by South Africa (31%) and Kenya (31%) and
the lowest in Cameron (14%) and Ethiopia (12%).
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Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics
N Mean Std Min Max
mobile phone 13814 060 049 0 1
mobile money 13814 012 032 0 1
mobile transfer 13814 013 033 0 1
mobile social 13814 015 035 0 1
mobile friends 13814 313 201 0 5
female 13814 053 050 0 1
married 13814 046 050 0 1
age below 25 13814 033 047 0 1
age > 25 and ≤ 35 13814 033 047 0 1
age > 35 and ≤ 45 13814 016 036 0 1
age > 45 and ≤ 55 13814 008 027 0 1
age > 55 and ≤ 65 13814 006 023 0 1
primary 13814 032 047 0 1
secondary 13814 033 047 0 1
tertiary 13814 013 033 0 1
employed 13814 023 042 0 1
self employed 13814 034 047 0 1
income > 20 and ≤ 100 13814 034 048 0 1
income > 100 and ≤ 300 13814 036 048 0 1
income > 300 and ≤ 500 13814 013 034 0 1
income > 500 13814 005 022 0 1
electricity 13814 062 049 0 1
radio 13814 066 047 0 1
tv 13814 049 050 0 1
satellite 13814 017 037 0 1
computer 13814 011 031 0 1
bank account 13814 048 050 0 1
fixed line 13814 007 025 0 1
Table 2.4 presents descriptive statistics for dependent and explanatory variables used
in the estimation. The explanatory variables can be divided into: (i) individual charac-
teristics such as gender, marital status, age group, level of education and employment;
household characteristics such as disposable income in US$ PPP, access to electricity, ra-
dio, TV, satellite TV, computer, bank account and fixed-line telephone. In addition, we
also use information on how many friends of the survey respondent have mobile phones.
This controls for network externalities in the adoption of mobile phones and mobile ser-
vices.
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2.4 The Econometric Model
We estimate a standard model in which an individual decides whether to adopt a mobile
phone or not. In addition, for the group of mobile phone adopters, we estimate three
models in which they decide whether to use, ‘mobile money’, ‘mobile transfers’ and ‘mobile
social’ services, which we defined in the previous section. Each of these decisions are 0-1
variables which are estimated using a logit model.
We assume that consumer i in geographic area m derives a linear utility from having
a mobile phone or using a mobile service given by:
Ui = Xiβ + Iimγ + im = Vi + i (2.1)
where Xi denotes a vector of individual and household characteristics specified in the
previous section, Iim is the availability of service infrastructure approximated by nighttime
light intensity in the geographic area where the individual resides and i is the error term
which is assumed to be extreme value distributed. The probability that individual i
decides to have a mobile phone, yim = 1, is given by:
Pi(yi = 1) =
exp(Vi)
1 + exp(Vi)
(2.2)
and the probability of not having a mobile phone is denoted by Pi(yi = 0) = 1−Pi(yi = 1).
The probability of using a particular mobile phone service can be written analogously.
Assuming that the decisions of all individuals in the sample i = 1, 2, ..., N are inde-
pendent, the cumulated log-likelihood function can be written as:
L(θ) =
N∑
i=1
yi log(Pi) (2.3)
The vector of all parameters, which is estimated using maximum likelihood estimators, is
denoted by θ = (β, γ).
2.5 Estimation Results
Table 2.5 shows the estimation results for eight logit regressions. First, we estimate two
regressions for an individual’s decision to adopt a mobile phone. The first estimation is
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conducted using full survey data and the second for a sample restricted to individuals
for whom nighttime light intensity data is available. Next, for the group of mobile phone
users, we estimate the decision to use the following mobile phone services: ‘mobile money’,
‘mobile transfers’ and ‘mobile social’. Again, we estimate these models using data of all
mobile phone adopters and a sample restricted to mobile phone users for whom nighttime
light intensity data is available. We use the same set of explanatory variables in all
regressions.13
13As shown in Table 2.1, there are large differences in the use of mobile services between countries
in the sample. We do not use country fixed effects in the estimation which explain large part of the
variation, but make many of the individual and household variables insignificant and do not have clear
economic interpretation.
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Table 2.5: Estimation results
Mobile phone Mobile money Mobile transfer Mobile social
Est. I Est. II Est. I Est. II Est. I Est. II Est. I Est. II
night light 0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.00
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
mobile friends 0.47*** 0.46*** 0.10*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.04 0.09*** 0.08***
(0.014) (0.017) (0.024) (0.026) (0.022) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
female -0.12** -0.09 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.19*** -0.42*** -0.41***
(0.053) (0.065) (0.062) (0.066) (0.058) (0.063) (0.062) (0.067)
married 0.19*** 0.21*** 0.37*** 0.38*** 0.37*** 0.38*** -0.15** -0.18**
(0.056) (0.068) (0.066) (0.071) (0.063) (0.068) (0.068) (0.074)
age below 25 0.21 0.05 0.75*** 0.89*** 0.57** 0.63** 1.35*** 1.51***
(0.134) (0.160) (0.270) (0.289) (0.230) (0.244) (0.234) (0.262)
age> 25 and ≤ 35 0.59*** 0.50*** 0.64** 0.77*** 0.43* 0.49** 0.77*** 0.93***
(0.135) (0.161) (0.268) (0.287) (0.229) (0.243) (0.234) (0.262)
age> 35 and ≤ 45 0.73*** 0.62*** 0.31 0.37 0.05 0.06 0.60** 0.72***
(0.142) (0.172) (0.274) (0.294) (0.235) (0.249) (0.240) (0.269)
age> 45 and ≤ 55 0.57*** 0.50*** 0.14 0.13 -0.18 -0.27 0.05 0.20
(0.154) (0.185) (0.288) (0.310) (0.250) (0.267) (0.257) (0.285)
age> 55 and ≤ 65 0.61*** 0.57*** 0.24 0.40 0.02 0.05 -0.45 -0.31
(0.160) (0.191) (0.303) (0.321) (0.263) (0.278) (0.286) (0.315)
primary 0.45*** 0.45*** 0.72*** 0.62*** 0.65*** 0.69*** 0.04 0.36
(0.068) (0.088) (0.172) (0.186) (0.155) (0.177) (0.175) (0.222)
secondary 1.15*** 1.10*** 0.93*** 0.71*** 0.84*** 0.80*** 0.53*** 0.74***
(0.079) (0.097) (0.171) (0.184) (0.154) (0.176) (0.168) (0.214)
tertiary 1.67*** 1.61*** 1.54*** 1.44*** 1.38*** 1.45*** 1.28*** 1.54***
(0.142) (0.160) (0.179) (0.193) (0.163) (0.184) (0.175) (0.220)
employed 0.40*** 0.50*** 0.46*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.45*** -0.19** -0.19**
(0.082) (0.095) (0.083) (0.088) (0.079) (0.084) (0.081) (0.088)
self-employed 0.03 0.22*** 0.30*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.36*** -0.43*** -0.39***
(0.064) (0.079) (0.087) (0.094) (0.082) (0.089) (0.090) (0.099)
income > 20 and ≤ 100 3.49*** 3.22*** -0.32 -0.04 0.34 0.39 0.37 0.32
(0.172) (0.186) (0.461) (0.503) (0.540) (0.546) (0.464) (0.473)
income > 100 and ≤ 300 3.92*** 3.61*** 0.14 0.40 0.87 0.92* 0.78* 0.73
(0.173) (0.187) (0.459) (0.499) (0.538) (0.544) (0.461) (0.469)
income > 300 and ≤ 500 3.89*** 3.75*** 0.08 0.33 0.78 0.82 1.10** 1.05**
(0.186) (0.204) (0.461) (0.502) (0.540) (0.546) (0.463) (0.472)
income > 500 4.41*** 4.15*** -0.27 0.02 0.58 0.66 1.34*** 1.28***
(0.251) (0.280) (0.470) (0.511) (0.546) (0.552) (0.467) (0.477)
electricity 0.44*** 0.32*** -0.77*** -0.76*** -0.65*** -0.66*** -0.17 -0.12
(0.067) (0.083) (0.104) (0.114) (0.099) (0.110) (0.121) (0.140)
radio 0.43*** 0.42*** 0.83*** 0.78*** 0.65*** 0.57*** 0.19** 0.20**
(0.054) (0.067) (0.088) (0.093) (0.079) (0.084) (0.078) (0.086)
TV 0.61*** 0.58*** 0.16 0.13 0.16* 0.18* 0.56*** 0.58***
(0.073) (0.086) (0.097) (0.104) (0.092) (0.099) (0.104) (0.117)
satellite 0.22** 0.34*** -0.82*** -0.82*** -0.69*** -0.68*** 0.10 0.11
(0.099) (0.110) (0.088) (0.093) (0.082) (0.086) (0.074) (0.080)
computer 0.31** 0.39*** 0.44*** 0.38*** 0.45*** 0.40*** 1.25*** 1.27***
(0.134) (0.145) (0.089) (0.094) (0.084) (0.089) (0.078) (0.084)
bank account 0.39*** 0.27*** 0.70*** 0.72*** 0.67*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.73***
(0.061) (0.072) (0.081) (0.087) (0.076) (0.083) (0.083) (0.093)
fixed-line -0.51*** -0.70*** -0.43*** -0.37*** -0.28** -0.18 0.13 0.16
(0.127) (0.142) (0.127) (0.134) (0.114) (0.121) (0.102) (0.111)
constant -6.67*** -6.42*** -4.52*** -4.29*** -4.50*** -4.08*** -4.54*** -4.97***
(0.221) (0.253) (0.559) (0.608) (0.604) (0.622) (0.547) (0.586)
Observations 13,814 9,666 8,292 6,702 8,292 6,702 8,292 6,702
Standard errors in parentheses: *** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Our main variable of interest is the availability of physical infrastructure approximated
by nighttime light intensity at the geographic location of survey respondents based on
a one kilometer radius. We find that, after controlling for individual and household
characteristics, the availability of infrastructure has a significant and positive impact on
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adoption of mobile phones. Thus, people residing in more developed areas tend to benefit
more from having a mobile phones. At the same time, the availability of infrastructure
has a significant and negative impact on the usage of mobile money and mobile transfers
in the mobile phone adopters group. For comparison, it has no impact on the use of
mobile phones for social and Internet activities. We test the robustness of this result
by re-estimating the model using two kilometers instead of a one kilometer radius. The
estimation results are broadly the same with a significant and positive impact of this
variable on mobile phone adoption and a significant and negative impact on the use
of mobile money and mobile transfers. Thus, mobile money can be considered as an
alternative to physical infrastructure which benefits people who live in remote areas and
may be excluded from access to financial services. This result confirms the role which
mobile phones have for social inclusion and economic development in developing countries
with poor physical infrastructure.
We find that the decision to adopt mobile phones and use mobile services is determined
by a number of consumer characteristics. In particular, the declared number of friends
and family members, who have mobile phones, has a significant and positive impact
on the probability of using a mobile phone. This effect can be attributed to network
externalities. When the number of mobile phone users in the communications circle of an
individual increases, the value of having a mobile phone also increases. Previous literature
also reports on the role of network externalities in the diffusion of mobile phones, see for
example, Birke & Swann (2010) and Grzybowski (2015). We also find that the number
of friends and family using mobile phones have a positive impact on the probability of
adopting mobile services considered.
Furthermore, we find that females are less likely to adopt mobile phones possibly
due to social and cultural factors. However, once they have a mobile phone, they are
more likely to use it for mobile money and mobile transfers but less likely for social and
Internet activities. This result suggests that women manage finances in the household.
Married individuals are more likely to adopt mobile phones and use it for mobile money
and transfers, but less likely for social and Internet activities. Individuals in the age
between 25 and 65 are more likely to adopt mobile phones than individuals who are
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less than 25 years. Interestingly, individuals aged between 15 and 35 are more likely to
use mobile phones for finances and for social and Internet activities than the other age
groups. Adoption of mobile phones and use of mobile services is higher for individuals
with education and increases with the level of education. Moreover, adoption of mobile
phones is higher among employed individuals. Usage of mobile phones for finances is also
higher for employed individuals, but at the same time, employment reduces the use of
mobile phones for social and Internet activities.
Individuals with higher disposable income are more likely to adopt mobile phones
but, interestingly, the level of income does not determine the use of mobile money and
transfers. At the same time, higher income groups are more likely to use mobile phones
for social and Internet activities. This result suggests that once consumers adopt a mobile
phone, all income groups benefit equally from mobile money and transfer services. This
emphasizes the role of mobile phones for social inclusion and economic development.
Table 2.6 illustrates shares of users of mobile services by disposable income categories. It
confirms that the adoption of mobile phones is determined by the level of income. In the
group of mobile phone adopters, however, the use of mobile money and transfer services
is comparable for all income categories, while mobile social and Internet services are used
more by wealthier individuals.
Table 2.6: Usage of mobile services (by income group)
Country Full sample Mobile phone users
Social Money Transfer Obs. Social Money Transfer Obs.
no income 0% 1% 0% 1566 16% 14% 9% 44
income > 0 and <= 20 6% 6% 7% 4753 13% 12% 13% 2335
income > 20 and <= 100 17% 17% 18% 4926 23% 21% 24% 3704
income > 100 and <= 300 28% 19% 21% 1863 34% 22% 25% 1546
income > 300 46% 16% 20% 706 49% 17% 22% 663
Total 15% 12% 13% 13814 24% 18% 21% 8292
Statistics for all survey respondents vs. mobile phone users.
Another result which indicates households with limited access to infrastructure benefit
from mobile financial services is that not having electricity at home negatively influences
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adoption of mobile phones, but has a positive impact on the use of mobile money and
transfers. Thus, people living in remote areas without basic infrastructure must rely
on mobile phones for financial transactions. Moreover, the ownership of radio, TV and
computer has overall a positive impact on adoption of mobile phones and mobile services.
This implies that better equipped and wealthier households are more likely to adopt
mobile phones and mobile services. Also, individuals with bank accounts are more likely
to adopt mobile phones and mobile services. Finally, individuals from households with
fixed-line connection are less likely to adopt mobile phones and use mobile money and
mobile transfers. This suggests that mobile and fixed-line connections are substitutes and
that fixed-line can be used as an alternative to financial transactions made on mobile
phones.
2.6 Conclusions
The deployment of mobile telecommunications overcomes the main burdens to economic
growth in developing countries, which are poor or non-existent physical infrastructure
including fixed-line and Internet access. In particular, mobile phones provide access to
services which are in general not available to low income households, such as mobile
phone-based financial, agricultural, health and educational services. However, the empir-
ical literature which documents the benefits brought by mobile phones to consumers in
low income countries is limited due to lack of detailed data. In this thesis, we contribute
to this literature by analyzing the determinants of adoption of mobile phones and mobile
financial services. We use a unique database which we combine using two data sources.
We use data from a survey of 13,814 individuals in 11 Sub-Saharan African countries in
2011, which includes answers to questions on access to mobile phones and use of mobile
services including mobile money, transfers and social and Internet activities. The survey
data is complemented with nighttime light intensity data, which we use to approximate
the availability of service infrastructure at the location of survey respondents. The use of
nighttime light intensity data enables us to analyze how spatial differences in infrastruc-
ture development across Sub-Saharan Africa influence the adoption of mobile phones and
use of mobile services by individuals.
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We estimate a number of logit regressions. After controlling for a number of indi-
vidual and household characteristics including disposable income, we find that adoption
of mobile phones is higher in areas with better physical infrastructure. However, in the
group of mobile phone adopters, the use of mobile phones for mobile money and trans-
fers is negatively influenced by the level of infrastructure. On the other hand, the use
of mobile phones to access services, such as email, skype, social media networks and In-
ternet browsing, is not dependent on the availability of physical infrastructure. In this
way, mobile money can be considered as an alternative to physical infrastructure which
benefits people who live in remote areas and may be excluded from access to financial
services. This result confirms the role which mobile phones have for social inclusion and
economic development in low income countries with poor physical infrastructure. Our re-
sults support the notion that mobile phones improve the livelihood of individuals residing
in remote areas by providing them with access to financial services which are otherwise
not available physically. Moreover, we find that while individuals with higher disposable
income are more likely to adopt mobile phones, the level of income does not determine use
of mobile money and transfers. At the same time, higher income groups are more likely
to use mobile phones for social and Internet activities. This result suggests that once
consumers adopt a mobile phone, all income groups benefit equally from mobile money
and transfer services. This emphasizes the role of mobile phones for social inclusion and
economic development.
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Chapter 3
The Impact of Mobile Number
Portability on Demand Price
Elasticities in Sub-Saharan Africa
3.1 Introduction
Provision of mobile telecommunication services requires large investments in infrastruc-
ture designed to access spectrum and coverage expansion.1 The industry is therefore
considered to be a natural oligopoly and licences to operate mobile networks are granted
only to a few competitors (see Valletti (2003)). Because of this constraint in the viable
number of competitors, the mobile telecommunications industry is often subject to compe-
tition concerns raised by the regulators and competition authorities. The characteristics
of the mobile industry make it susceptible to collusion and the exercise of market power.
In addition, consumers of mobile services tend to have high switching costs, which may
weaken competition among existing firms and make successful entry of new firms diffi-
cult. Moreover, the increasing usage of mobile Internet services and scarcity of spectrum
has already led to a reduction in the number of competitors in a few countries, in which
mergers between mobile operators were cleared by the regulators.2
Critical market information in the assessment of market power and price effects of
mergers are price elasticities of demand. Price elasticities of demand are also an input
1The radio spectrum includes both licensed and unlicensed frequencies up to 300GHz used to transmit
voice, video and data.
2For instance, in 2014 the European Commission cleared Telefonica’s 8.6 billion Euros takeover of
German mobile rival E-Plus.
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into regulation of telecommunications incumbents. For instance, in the case of Ramsey
pricing regulation, prices for individual services are set above marginal cost according to
each service’s price elasticity of demand. Since the price elasticities of demand are an
important input into policy debates in telecommunications markets, there is a growing
number of studies which provides such estimates. In particular, due to the differentiated
products character of mobile industry, the appropriate estimation of price elasticities
requires use of firm-level data.
Most of the empirical studies estimating price elasticities focus on developed economies.
We are not aware of any studies estimating price elasticities of demand for mobile markets
in African countries. This is mainly due to the scarcity of firm-level data. Furthermore,
even though a number of regulatory authorities in Africa have introduced mobile number
portability (MNP), which allows consumers to keep their phone numbers when changing
operator, we are not aware of any study that evaluates the impact of this policy on price
elasticities of demand and competition between operators. This chapter contributes to
the literature by estimating price elasticities of demand for a number of African countries
using operator-level time series data. In addition, in the estimation we allow the price
elasticities of demand to depend on whether MNP is in place in a particular country. For
this purpose, we use quarterly data for 27 operators in seven African countries between
2010:Q4 and 2014:Q4 to estimate multinomial logit of demand.
We find that MNP increased own-price elasticities of demand in countries that have
implemented a policy that mandates MNP. The increase in price elasticities due to MNP
may be a result of the reduction in switching costs between operators. On average,
the introduction of MNP increases own-price elasticities by 0.47 in absolute terms. We
compare the level of price elasticities before and after the implementation of MNP in
Ghana and Kenya, which implemented this policy in the time period of our study. Our
results suggest that in Ghana, MNP increased own-price elasticities by an average of 0.35
in absolute value from an average across firms and over time of -0.74. In Kenya, the
introduction of MNP increased own-price elasticities by an average of 0.21 in absolute
term from a lower average value across firms and over time of -0.39. However, we find
that in Kenya and Ghana, the average own-price elasticities remained small even after
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the implementation of MNP relative to other countries without MNP in place. Thus,
our results suggest that MNP is not a complete solution for increasing competitiveness in
the mobile industry. Generally, operator own-price elasticities are high in all the sampled
countries except for Ghana and Kenya.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses theoretical
and empirical literature on switching costs and demand price elasticities in the mobile
telecommunication markets. Section 3.3 provides an overview of implementation of mobile
number portability in Sub-Saharan African countries. Section 4.4 presents the data.
Section 4.5 introduces the empirical model. Section 3.7 discusses the estimation results
and Section 3.8 concludes.
3.2 Literature Review
This chapter draws on two strands of literature on price elasticities and switching costs.
There is a consensus in the theoretical literature that switching costs reduce consumer
responsiveness to price changes, and make each firms’ individual demand less elastic
(see, for example, Von Weizsa¨cker (1984), Klemperer (1987a), Klemperer (1987b) and
Shy (2002)). However, there is little evidence of the impact of switching costs on price
elasticities.
Among studies which estimate price elasticities of demand in mobile telecommunica-
tions markets, Doganoglu & Grzybowski (2007) use aggregate monthly firm-level data
for Germany to estimate price elasticities of demand for subscriptions. They find large
own-price elasticities ranging from -5.04 to -4.20. In another study, Grzybowski & Pereira
(2007) use a model proposed by Doganoglu & Grzybowski (2007) to estimate own- and
cross-price elasticities for mobile telecommunication subscriptions in Portugal. Using
quarterly data, they find large own-price elasticities ranging from -6.41 to -2.59. In an-
other study, Iimi (2005) estimates price elasticities using operator-level data for Japan,
which contains information on subscriptions and prices between January 1996 to Decem-
ber 1999. He finds high own-price elasticities ranging from -1.30 to -2.43.
There is consensus with regard to the existence of switching costs in the mobile tele-
phone industry, (see for instance Lee et al. (2006), Grzybowski (2008b)), which may be
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due to compatibility, transaction or search costs. However, we are not aware of any em-
pirical literature that provides evidence on how switching costs affect price elasticities in
the mobile telephone services. Literature that evaluates the impact of switching costs on
price elasticities in other industries includes a paper by Strombom et al. (2002) who use
a data set containing information on choice of health plans and premiums for 103,835
University of California employees. They estimate a conditional logit model and find that
price sensitivity declines with consumer’s age which is the determinant of switching costs.
Hartmann & Viard (2008) analyze switching costs in the context of a dynamic structural
model of demand in a reward program. They consider a program in which golfers are
given a green fee certificate after purchasing ten rounds of golf. The green card entitles
subscribers to a discount of 25, 50 or 100% off the price of a round of golf depending
on the course. They find that when customers face significant switching costs, their de-
mand become less elastic. The study concludes that when customers are not locked-in,
in other words, when customers have no incentive from the program, elasticities mimic
those realized when the program did not exist.
Another stream of literature that is close to the present study is the literature on MNP
and switching costs. For instance, Gans et al. (2001) and Bu¨hler et al. (2006) conclude
that MNP reduces switching costs by allowing subscribers to retain their number when
changing operators. However, these studies draw their conclusions from a qualitative
analysis. Lyons et al. (2006) use international time-series cross-sectional data for 22
quarters between 1999 and 2004 to examine the impact of MNP on market outcomes. They
find that MNP reduces switching costs. Using quarterly panel data of 218 major operators
in 52 countries for the period 2003-2009, Wei & Zhu (2010) find that the introduction of
MNP reduces switching costs and balances market shares between large and small firms.
Specifically, they find that MNP reduces large firms’ market share by an average of 0.8%,
while small firms gain on average 1.5%. They also find that large firms become more
profitable after the introduction of MNP.
In another study, Viard (2007) studies the effect of number portability on switching
costs and price competition when new and old consumers are charged the same price.
Using a dataset that contains information on the nature of subscriber contracts and the
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timing of portability decisions, he employs a difference-in-difference estimation strategy
and concludes that portability reduces switching costs and increases price competition.
Studies which conclude that MNP reduces switching costs do not provide empirical
evidence on the size of the impact of MNP on price elasticities. We fill this gap in the
literature by providing empirical evidence on the impact of MNP on price elasticities of
demand in selected African countries using firm-level data. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first study that uses detailed firm-level data for mobile telecommunications
markets in African countries for this purpose. It therefore provides useful information for
competition and regulatory proceedings.
3.3 Mobile Number Portability in Sub-Saharan Africa
Mobile number portability is recognized as an important tool to intensify competition
between mobile operators and, as of 2012, was implemented in 73 countries worldwide.3
In Africa, the facility has been implemented by eight countries: Democratic Republic
of Congo, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa and Sudan (see Table
3.1).4 Among these countries, due to the availability of data, this present study considers
Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South Africa.
Table 3.1: African Countries with MNP
Country Time Country Time
Egypt 07/04/2008 Nigeria 01/01/2007
Ghana 07/07/2011 South Africa 10/11/2006
Kenya 01/07/2011 DRC 30/09/2009
Morocco 01/01/2007 Sudan 01/11/2012
Source: mcclist.com
Notes: Table 3.1 presents African countries with mobile number portability and the
date at which number portability was implemented in each country.
3see mcclist.com
4As pointed out by Bu¨hler & Haucap (2004), the first country to adopt MNP is Singapore in 1997.
However, MNP in Singapore was only call forwarding. In order to use this facility, one had to have two
mobile phone numbers at the same time. A more structural MNP based on a centralized database was
introduced in the UK, Hong Kong, and the Netherlands as early as 1999.
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A number of factors differentiate MNP implementation in African countries. These
includes the speed of processing requests and the time allowed to effect another port after
completing the previous one. By 2014, on average, it took four minutes and 16 seconds
to complete the porting process in Ghana. For comparison, in Nigeria, the process took
48 working hours.5
The MNP in Ghana was launched in 2011 and by the end of 2014. The policy was
implemented to facilitate competition among operators. The number of successfully com-
pleted ports amounted to 1,655,404 among which 832,202 were completed in 2014. As of
2014, after only three years, the total number of completed ports stood at 6% of the total
active mobile numbers.6 The evolution of market share shows that prior to the introduc-
tion of MNP in 2011 in Ghana, MTN contolled around 52% of the market.7 Its share
declined over time after the implementation of MNP, from 51% to 46% in 2014. Tigo,
the second largest mobile operator in Ghana also lost some market share due to MNP.
Its market share declined from 21%, prior MNP, to 14% in 2014. The largest gainer was
Vodafone, which increased its market shares to 23% in 2014 from 16% in 2010. These
dynamics shows that the implementation of MNP in Ghana increased consumer mobility
across competitors.
In Kenya, MNP policy was implemented in 2011 with the objective of reducing the
market power of Safaricom, which owned 68% of market at that time. However, this
policy did not achieve its intended objective due to low demand for porting. Only 163
ports were successfully completed in 2016 with about 1,388, less than 0.01% of subscriber
base, completed in 2014.8 To revive this failed policy, in 2016, the regulator stipulated
new guidelines aimed at shortening and simplifying the switching process. These included
zero charges for porting requests and a time cap of four hours for completing the porting
process. The observed market share dynamics suggest that indeed MNP did not achieve
its objective of reducing Safaricom’s dominance. In 2010, prior to the implementation of
5Source:www.balancingact-africa
6Source:www.balancingact-africa
7For all the discussions on market shares refer to Figure A.2 for Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria and South
Africa, which are countries that have implemented MNP. Refer to Figure A.3 for countries that have not
implemented MNP: Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia
8www.balancingact-africa.com
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MNP, Safaricom owned 69% of the market. Its market share declined to 68% in 2011,
which is the year of MNP implementation. A further decline was observed in 2012 with
Safaricom losing 4% of its market share, its lost share was mostly gained by Essar Telecom
(3%). However, between 2013 and 2014, Safaricom gained more market share which stood
at 68% in 2014. Thus, in the first years of implementation, mobile subscribers switched
from the large operator to smaller operators. Nevertheless, over time, subscribers switched
from smaller operators to the market leader, Safaricom.
South Africa launched MNP in 2006. In 2012, around 1.2 million ports were suc-
cessfully completed out of a subscriber base of about 60 million. As of 2012, the net
gainer from this process is Vodacom with an overall increase of 150,000 in its subscriber
base.9. Although, in totality, the market observed switching between 2006 and 2012, the
market share of dominant operators stagnated at 37% for MTN and 47% for Vodacom in
the period 2010 to 2012. This implies that the demand for porting declined over time.
Between 2010 and 2012, consumer mobility was observed in 2011, with Cell C losing 1%
of its market share to the smallest operator, Telkom. However, between 2012 and 2014,
the two dominant operators lost some of their market share. The market share for MTN
declined to 33% while that one of Vodacom fell to 43%. The biggest gainer from these
movements was the third largest operator, Cell C, which increased its market share from
15% to 22% between 2012 and 2014.
In Nigeria, MNP was introduced in 2007. However, little data has emerged about
the usage of this facility in Nigeria. During the time of implementation, there were
115,000 ports which were successfully completed.10 Although the market is dominated
by two operators, MTN and Globacom, since 2010 the market shares of these dominant
operators have been declining. As of 2010, MTN controlled 48% of the total mobile
subscriptions. However, this was reduced to 45% in 2014. The second largest mobile
operator, Glabacom, also saw a decline in market share from 24% in 2010 to 20% in 2014,
over the same period. While the market share of Airtel have mostly remained constant,
Etisalat gained some market share growing from 8% to 15% between 2010 and 2014.
A similar trend in market shares are also be observed in countries that have not im-
9businesstech.co.za
10www.balancingact-africa.com
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plemented MNP. Early entrants are losing market share to small operators. In Botswana,
Mascom Wireless saw a decline in its market share from 58% in 2010 to 55% in 2014, while
Orange Botswana saw its market share decline from 32% to 28% in the same period. This
was largely gained by the third entrant, beMOBILE, which increased its market share
from 10% in 2010 to 16% in 2014.
In Mozambique, the first entrant, Mozambique Cellular, lost market share from 2010
to 2014. Between 2010 and 2011, its market share declined by 3% from 69% which was
largely gained by the second competitor, Vodacom, which increased its market shares from
31% to 34%. The successful entry of the third operator, Movitel in 2012, further reduced
the market share of Mozambique Cellular from 66% in 2011 to 44% in 2012 and 34% in
2014. The lost market share were largely gained by the new entrant, which increased its
market share from 11% in 2011 to 30% in 2014.
Similarly, in Zambia, the largest operator, Airtel, saw a decline in its market share
over the period of the study. By 2010, Airtel controlled 56% of the total subscriptions.
This declined to 43% in 2014. The largest gainer was MTN, which increased its market
share from 35% in 2010 to 48% in 2014. Zamtel gained some market share in the period
between 2010 to 2013, increasing its share from 10% to 13%, but in 2014 its share declined
to 10%.
3.4 Data
The data used in this chapter consists of a unique quarterly panel between 2010:Q4 and
2014:Q4 for 28 mobile operators in seven African countries: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia. The sampled countries were chosen
based on market characteristics and wholesale regulatory policies. For instance, all coun-
tries in the sample have adopted a glide path policy in termination rates. We did not
include North African countries in our sample due to different market characteristics.
North African countries adopt the Arab telecommunication standards and, in some in-
stance, their calls are terminated in other countries such as France.
Countries with monopoly and those that have licensed only two operators were also
not considered in the sample on the basis that they are less likely to adopt MNP. To be
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precise, countries with one operator, such as Ethiopia and Swaziland, cannot adopt MNP,
while those with two operators are likely not to implement this facility due to high costs
of implementation. Furthermore, our sample is also determined by the availability and
consistency of data. For instance, MTRs data is very scarce and we were able to collect
MTRs for nine countries. However, we could not include Tanzania and Uganda in the
sample due to price data inconsistencies.
The constructed dataset contains information about operator prepaid prices, number
of prepaid subscribers, population, mobile termination rates (MTRs) and time of imple-
mentation of MNP. The price information was obtained from Research ICT Africa (RIA).
The number of subscribers to particular operators and population were gathered from
World Cellular Information Service (WCIS).11 MTRs data was obtained from different
data sources, as presented in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2: Termination Rates Data Sources
Country Data source
Botswana www.bocra.co.bw ; www.emeraldinsight.com
Ghana www.itu.int
Kenya www.standardmedia.co.ke
Mozambique www.researchictafrica.net ; http://researchictafrica.net
Nigeria www.itu.int; www.techcentral.co.za
South Africa www.helgilibrary.com
Zambia news.idg.no; www.mediastudies.co.za
Note: Due to lack of a single data set, data for termination rates in Africa was
collected from a number of data sources.
Mobile prepaid prices and termination rates are expressed in local currencies and,
for the purposes of this analysis are transformed to US$ purchasing power parity (US$
PPP) using the World Bank conversion factor. Pricing of telecommunication services
needs careful consideration due to its complexity. Mobile phone consumers face different
tariff plans and they are billed based on destination and timing of their calls. The phone
11Research ICT Africa (RIA) is a regional information and communication telecommunications policy
and regulation think tank active across Africa and the Global South. RIA tracks prepaid mobile prices for
voice, short messages and broadband services and conduct telecommunication surveys. World Cellular
Information Surveys (WCIS) is the cellular world’s benchmark source of global mobile subscriptions,
KPIs, financial and operational indicators.
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calls can be made on- or off-net and during peak or off-peak hours. In addition to voice
communication, consumers can use a wide range of other services including SMS, data,
and others.
Empirical studies on mobile telecommunications typically use different measures for
prices of mobile phone services. For instance, Shy (2002) uses average revenue per user
(ARPU), while Grajek (2010) uses the lowest average customer bill. On the other hand,
Fuentelsaz et al. (2012) and Cho et al. (2013) use price per minute, which is computed
by dividing ARPU by the average monthly minutes of usage (MOU). The problem with
the approach used by Shy (2002), Grajek (2010), Fuentelsaz et al. (2012) and Cho et al.
(2013), is that it does not take into consideration the timing and destination of phone
calls, which determines the price. Other studies construct a price for mobile phone ser-
vices using information on usage profiles (see, for instance, Doganoglu & Grzybowski
(2013)). These studies assume that a representative prepaid user makes a certain number
of phone calls per month, which are distributed across time and networks according to
certain assumptions. The cost of the usage basket represents the prepaid price of mobile
services. We take a similar approach to these studies and use as prepaid price, the cost
of usage basket, which was constructed by RIA using the Teligen Ltd approach.12 Table
3.3 presents the assumed distribution of minutes and messages according to destination
network and time of the day.
12For more details on the basket see www.oecd.org
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Table 3.3: Distribution of minutes and SMS depending on time and destination network
Timing Minutes Proportion minutes
(1) (2)
On-net-peak 12.55 0.60
On-net-off-peak 7.91 0.50
Off-net-peak 6.82 0.40
Off-net-peak 6.26 0.50
Off-net-off-peak 3.94 0.40
Off-net-offoff-peak 3.40 0.60
Fixed peak 4.42 0.50
Fixed off-peak 2.78 0.40
Fixed offoff-peak 2.40
On-net peak SMS 18.02
Off-net-peak SMS 31.02
Off-net-off-peak SMS 15.98
Total basket minutes 50.48
Total SMS 100
Source: ResearchICTAfrica
Notes: The number of minutes depending on time and destination
network, which were assumed to create price for voice call services.
Column (1) shows the number of minutes/SMS and column (2)
presents the the share of minutes that are charged at subsidized
prices.
Figure A.4 shows changes in operators’ prices over time for four countries which imple-
mented MNP, while Figure A.5 shows price for countries without MNP. For both groups
of countries, prices for mobile phone services are decreasing over time. Figure A.4 shows
that immediately after the implementation of MNP in Ghana, prices declined sharply,
while in Kenya prices first increased but then followed a downward trend. South Africa
was the first country which adopted MNP in the third quarter of 2006, followed by Nigeria
in the first quarter of 2007. Ghana and Kenya introduced the facility in the second and
third quarter of 2011 respectively. For the latter two countries, the implementation of
MNP falls within the period of the study, as shown in Figure A.4.
In the time period covered by our study, there were also new licences given to mobile
operators in Ghana, Mozambique and Nigeria. In 2012, two mobile operators, Etisalat
and Glo Mobile, were granted licenses to operate mobile technology in Nigeria and Ghana,
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respectively. Our period of study covers the time when Expresso, one of the companies in
Ghana, experienced significant liquidity challenges after the takeover by Sudanese based
Sudatel Telecom Group (STG). This has led to the regulator banning the company from
registering new subscribers in 2014.13 We present these entry periods in Figure A.4 and
A.5
Another variable which requires careful consideration when modelling demand of mo-
bile phone services is subscription. This is because pre- and post-paid subscribers are
offered differentiated services.14 The services are differentiated by price. Existing litera-
ture typically uses the aggregated network subscriber base (see, for instance, Karacuka et
al. (2011)). We find this to be a critical shortcoming in the literature since there is differ-
entiation in services provided to different subscribers. Literature that uses firm-specific
tariff in the estimation of demand is very rare. Dewenter & Haucap (n.d.) use data on
pre- and post-paid to calculate price elasticities.
Our rich data contains firm-level information disaggregated into pre- and post-paid
subscribers. This allows us to take a similar approach to Dewenter & Haucap (n.d.).
Though we have information on pre- and post-paid subscriptions, we focus on estimating
demand for mobile pre-paid services. This is because we were unable to find information
on post-paid prices. Furthermore, the share of post-paid subscriptions in Africa is very
small (4%).15 Moreover, this study only concerned with the total number of registered
subscriptions which are in regular use rather than the total subscriptions, which might
include inactive subscribers. The information on the number of prepaid subscribers is
used to construct market shares. To do this, we need to define market size which is
assumed to be twice the population size because, in some countries, the penetration rate
is higher than 100%. Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics of variables used in this
study. We were unable to get prices for all the quarters of 2014 for MTN Zambia.
13www.modernghana.com
14Pre-paid subscriptions require pre-payment and does not require a contract. The post-paid allows
post-payment for services which requires a contract for a minimum of one month.
15see www.globalrewardsolutions.com
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Price (US$ PPP) 420 15.60 7.622 2.970 37.31
Subscription (mln) 424 9.827 12.00 0.1 59.90
MTR 459 0.0918 0.0350 0.0387 0.195
MNP 459 0.580 0.494 0 1
Share 424 0.117 0.0954 0.00223 0.429
Operator’s age 449 12.44 5.555 1 23
Notes: Operator’s age represents the number of years a firm has been operating
in a country.
3.5 The Model
Modeling the demand side of product differentiation dates back to Lancaster (1971) and
McFadden et al. (1973). In this study, we consider mobile telecommunication services as
differentiated products since we observe that firms charge different prices, provide product
of different quality and invest in branding and advertising. Our empirical model follows
Berry (1994) for case of the multinomial logit model, where operator market shares are
derived as the aggregate outcome of individual consumer decisions. We assume that each
consumer selects one among all mobile operators available in a country. The consumer
may also eventually choose an ’outside’ option, which is not to use mobile services at all.
Hence, the choice set consists of J + 1 alternatives. The utility which consumer i derives
from subscribing to mobile operator j in country m at time t is given by:
Uijmt = x
′
jmtβ − αpjmt + ξjmt + εijmt = δjmt + εijmt (3.1)
where the price of subscription is denoted by pjmt, the vector x
′
jmt includes operator
dummy variables and a dummy for MNP implementation in a country, ξjmt is the un-
observed product quality and εjt, is the logit error term, which is assumed to be double
exponential distributed. The utility of the outside good is normalized to zero and becomes
Ui0mt = εi0mt. In addition, the coefficient on price is interacted with the dummy variable
for the implementation of MNP in a country, which should capture the effect of MNP on
price elasticities of demand.
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An individual i chooses operator j in country m and quarter t if this choice maximizes
the utility among all available alternatives, in other words, if Uijmt = maxn∈AimtUinmt
where Aimt is individual i’s available choice set in country m and quarter t. Following
Berry (1994), there is a one-to-one representation between the mean utility values and
the market shares, which yields the following equation which we take to the data:
ln(sjmt/s0mt) = δjmt = x
′
jmtβ − αpjmt + ξjmt (3.2)
For multinomial logit model, the price elasticity of demand is written as follows:
∂sijt
∂pikt
pikt
sijt
=
−αpijt(1− sjt), if k = j.αpijtsikt, otherwise; (3.3)
3.6 Identification
A practical endogenous concern with all empirical analysis that assesses the effect of a
legislative initiative (such as MNP) on an outcome (in our case utility) is understanding
the motivation behind the introduction of such a policy. Specifically, we need to assess
whether or not the adoption of MNP was driven by low levels of utility of mobile telecom-
munication consumers. If the adoption of MNP was endogenous to utility of consumers,
the unbiased impact of the initiative on price elasticities will be hard to estimate.
Consistent with existing empirical studies, we consider the introduction of MNP as
an exogenous policy to reduce switching costs. In practice, the authorities set stringent
implementation dates, and mobile telecommunication agents (consumers and operators)
consider it as a given external shifter of market condition (see, for instance, Bu¨hler et al.
(2006); Park (2011); Cho et al. (2013)). As long as pricing strategies developed by mobile
carriers and the utility of consumers do not influence the implementation date or the
government’s policy schemes, we can treat the policy as an exogenous factor with respect
to operators’ pricing decisions and consumer choices. However, it is still necessary to
check whether or not market characteristics, including price and consumer utility, drove
the adoption of MNP. For instance, if the adoption period of MNP is endogenous to
the price and utility of consumers or highly correlated to market attributes, it is hard
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to estimate the unbiased impact of the law. We therefore present this in greater detail
here by discussing the background of MNP adoption in Sub-Sahara African countries and
present empirical evidence.
In most countries, the regulator’s decision to implement MNP is based on the motive
to facilitate market competition by decreasing market power of the incumbent. For in-
stance, in South Korea, the authority adopted MNP because the regulator assessed that
the incumbent was exploiting excessive profits by introducing a 3-digit identification pre-
fix. In terms of MNP adoption in African countries, however, the major difference from
other countries is that the regulator’s decision on whether to adopt MNP or not cannot
be attributed to market characteristics. For instance, most African authorities have not
implemented MNP even though the telecommunications market is dominated by incum-
bent operators. The decision not to implement MNP in Botswana and Uganda was based
on costs of implementing the facility, while other countries have shown no interest in the
facility.16 This suggests that, the adoption of MNP in Africa is likely to be based on
external pressures rather than on internal market conditions.
For robustness checks, it is necessary to check whether or not the time adoption of
MNP across countries is correlated with the dependent variable to market factors, such
as utility, price and the time since entry of mobile operator. Following Romanosky et al.
(2011) and Cho et al. (2013), we test whether the implementation of MNP is affected by
utility of consumers and other market characteristics by running Cox proportional hazard
regression. We present the results in Table 3.5.
16(see www.budde.com.au, www.cellular-news.com)
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Table 3.5: Exogeneity check: Cox proportional hazard regression
VARIABLES (1) (2)
Utility -0.066 0.011
(0.054) (0.063)
Price -0.037***
(0.009)
Operators’ age -0.034
(0.123)
(0.130)
Observations 424 420
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1
Column (1) presents a regression with utility as the only explanatory variable and
Column (2) shows the results of estimating the model with all market variables such as
price and operators’ age. We find no particular correlation between MNP and utility in
columns (1) and (2). The estimated hazard ratio values for utility are are not statistically
significant. This finding which does not support the endogeneity of MNP.
3.7 The Results
We estimate the demand specification given by equation 3.2 with a set of explanatory
variables including the operator-level price of mobile subscription, a dummy variable for
the implementation of MNP in a country, operator-specific fixed effects, the time passed
since the operator entered the market, as well as the interaction term of MNP dummy
variable with price. The use of panel data techniques require testing whether the error
term are correlated with the regressor. We perform a Hausman test, which allow us to
reject the null hypothesis of random effects in favour of panel data fixed effects technique.
Since price of mobile services is correlated with the error term, which represents unob-
served quality of mobile services, the ordinary least square (OLS) estimation yields biased
results (see Berry (1994)). We account for endogeneity of price and its interaction term
with MNP dummy by means of instrumental variables (IV) estimation. As instruments,
we use country-level termination rates and termination rates interacted with the MNP
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dummy variable. Termination rates are the key component of marginal costs for mobile
operators. Since they are usually set during a regulatory process, they should not be cor-
related with the error term. We also perform Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of endogeneity,
which does not allow rejecting the null hypothesis of endogeneity of price and its inter-
action term with MNP. The estimation results are shown in Table 3.6, where column (1)
presents OLS estimation and column (2) presents IV estimation.
Table 3.6: Estimation results for ordinary least squares (OLS) and instrumental variables
(IV)
Variables OLS IV
Price -0.031*** -0.066***
(0.006) (0.025)
MNP*Price 0.002 -0.041**
(0.006) (0.020)
MNP 0.081 0.605***
(0.078) (0.184)
Operator’s age 0.986*** -0.216
(0.123) (0.338)
Constant -5.301*** -1.254
(0.413) (1.342)
Observations 410 410
Number of operators 27 27
Operator fixed effects Yes Yes
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *
p<0.1. In the IV estimation we use MTRs and MTRs interacted
with MNP as instruments.
In both the OLS and IV regression, the coefficient on price is significant and negative.
It increases in magnitude in the IV estimation, which suggests that the instrumental
variables that we used, correct for the bias in the estimate of price coefficient by means
of OLS. The interaction term of price and MNP dummy is insignificant in the OLS
estimation, but becomes significant with a negative sign in the IV regression. This implies
that MNP increased price elasticity of demand in countries which implemented this policy.
The increase in price elasticity due to MNP may be a result of a reduction in switching
costs between operators. At the same time, MNP has a significant and positive impact on
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the utility which consumers derive from mobile services. This is suggested by a positive
and significant coefficient on MNP dummy variable in the IV estimation. The time
since entry of the mobile operator, which may approximate the recognition of brand by
consumers, is not significant in the IV estimation, even though it was significant and
positive in the OLS estimation. We do not report the estimates of operator-specific fixed
effects due to space constraints.
We use IV estimates to compute average operator-specific price elasticities. Table
3.7 presents country-specific average own-price elasticities for the time period of this
study. We find that, on average, MNP increases own-price elasticities by 0.47 in absolute
terms. The data set used in this study contains information for before and after the
implementation of MNP in Kenya and Ghana. Thus, we are able to compare the impact
of MNP on own-price elasticities before and after implementation. Our results suggest
that the introduction of MNP in Ghana increased own-price elasticities by an average of
0.35 in absolute terms, from an average of -0.74. On the other hand, in Kenya, own-price
elasticities increased by an average of 0.21 in absolute term from a lower average of -0.39.
Table 3.7: Mean country-level own-price elasticities between 2010:Q4-2014:Q4
Country Mean Sd Min Max
Botswana -1.225 0.311 -1.770 -0.798
Ghana -0.878 0.174 -1.266 -0.505
Kenya -0.514 0.108 -0.694 -0.291
Mozambique -1.520 0.294 -2.352 -1.196
Nigeria -1.570 0.680 -2.980 -0.664
South Africa -1.752 0.472 -2.714 -0.945
Zambia -0.965 0.255 -1.364 -0.449
Calculations based on IV estimation.
We also compare average price elasticities for countries and periods in which MNP
was in place with those where it was not. We find that average own-price elasticities
are -1.23 for periods in the presence of MNP and -1.11 for periods in the absence of
MNP. However, a country level comparison shows that, in Kenya and Ghana, the average
own-price elasticities remained small, even after the implementation of MNP, relative
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to other countries without MNP in place (see Table 3.7). This may be attributed to
the market structure and other factors in these two countries. For instance, in Kenya,
Safaricom continues to dominate the voice traffic and the mobile money markets.17 Thus,
our results suggest that MNP is not the ultimate solution for increasing competitiveness
in the mobile industry.
Excluding Kenya and Ghana from the analysis, we find average own-price elasticities
of -1.66 for countries that implemented MNP prior to the period of our study. As for
countries that never implemented MNP, we find average own-price elasticities of -1.21.
These numbers are higher than the average own-price price elasticities for the whole
sample. This result shows that demand for telecommunication services is generally elastic.
The demand, however, is more elastic in countries with MNP than those that have not
implemented MNP, except for Kenya and Ghana.
Finally we discuss own- and cross-price elasticities for operators in our sample. We
categorize countries in groups according to the timing of MNP implementation. In the
first group, we include countries with no MNP (Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia).
The second group includes countries that introduced MNP prior to the period of study
(Nigeria and South Africa), the third group consists of countries that adopted MNP in
a time that falls within the period of the study (Ghana and Kenya). Table 3.8 presents
own- and cross-price elasticities for countries in group 1. Table 3.9 presents the own-
and cross-price elasticities for countries in group 2, while Table 3.10 presents own- and
cross-price elasticities for countries belonging to group 3. We find large operator own-price
elasticities in group 2 countries relative to group 1 and group 3 countries. Surprisingly, we
find smaller and inelastic own price elasticities in group 2 relative to operator own-price
elasticities in group 1 countries, which are generally elastic. This result suggests that even
after the introduction of MNP in Kenya and Ghana, firms’ own-price elasticities remained
small compared to countries that have not implemented MNP.
In Botswana, the own-price elasticities of beMOBILE and Orange are high. However,
we find low values for own-price elasticity for Mascom Wireless. A percentage increase in
the price of beMOBILE decreased its sales by 1.56% and increased the sales of Orange and
17see www.ca.go.ke and www.businessdailyafrica.com
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Table 3.8: Mean operator own- and cross-price elasticities between 2010:Q4-2014Q:4
Botswana beMobile Orange Mascom
beMobile -1.556 0.176 0.176
Orange 0.315 -1.179 0.315
Mascom 0.621 0.621 -0.939
Mozabique Vodacom Movitel MCellular
Vodacom -1.651 0.101 0.101
Movitel 0.106 -1.223 0.106
MCellular 0.140 0.140 -1.458
Zambia Airtel MTN Zamtel
Airtel -1.061 0.172 0.172
MTN 0.08 -0.665 0.08
Zamtel 0.042 0.042 -1.135
Notes: Countries which have not implemented MNP.
Mascom by 0.18% each. Moreover, a 1% increase in price of Orange decreased its sales
by 1.18% and increased sales of beMOBILE and Orange by 0.32% each. In Mozambique,
all operator own-price elasticities are high. A 1% increase in the price of MCellular
decreased its sales by 1.46% and increased the sales of Vodacom and Movitel by 0.14%
each. However, the same incremental price increase of Movitel decreased its sales by 1.22%
and increased the sales of Mcellular and Vodacom by 0.11% each. Moreover, a similar
increase in the price of Vodacom decreased its sales by 1.65% and increased the sales of
both Mcellular and Movitel by 0.10%. In Zambia, we find low own-price elasticities for
MTN, while own-price elasticities for Airtel and Zamtel are high. A percentage increase
in the price of Airtel decreased its sales by 1.06% and increased the subscriptions of MTN
and Zamtel by 0.17% each (see Table 3.8).
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Table 3.9: Mean operator own- and cross-price elasticities between 2010:Q4-2014Q:4
Nigeria Globacom Airtel Etisalat MTN
Globacom -1.083 0.076 0.076 0.076
Airtel 0.123 -1.968 0.123 0.123
Etisalat 0.082 0.082 -1.698 0.082
MTN 0.249 0.249 0.249 -1.576
South Africa Cell C Vodacom Telkom MTN
Cell C -1.773 0.211 0.211 0.211
Vodacom 0.627 -1.592 0.627 0.627
Telkom 0.023 0.023 -1.833 0.023
MTN 0.515 0.515 0.515 -1.807
Notes: Countries which implemented MNP before 2010.
In Nigeria and South Africa, operator own-price elasticity are high. In Nigeria, we find
that a 1% increase in the price of Airtel decreased its sales by 1.97% and increased the
sales of Globacom, Etisalat and MTN by 0.12% each. A similar increase in the price of
MTN reduces its sales by 1.58% and increased the sales of Globacom, Airtel and Etisalat
by 0.25% each. In South Africa, a percentage increase in the price of MTN decreased its
sales by 1.81% and increased sales of Cell C, Telkom and Vodacom by 0.52% each. A
similar incremental price increase of Cell C decreased its sales by 1.77% and increased the
sales of MTN, Telkom and Vodacom by 0.21% each (see Table 3.9). In Kenya, all operator
own-price elasticities are low, while in Ghana only one operator, Expresso, among the six,
have high own-price elasticity. A 1% increase in the price of Expresso decreased its sales
by 1.12% and increased sales of Airtel, Glo, MTN, Tigo and Vodafone by an insignificant
percent.
Assuming that observed prices are the result of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium, we
make use of the first-order equation to get information about marginal marginal costs.
This strategy ignores the effects of current prices on future profits. Thus it overestimates
markup hence these measures are an upperbound. Following Berry (1994), the marginal
cost may be written as
cjmt = pjmt − 1
α(1− sjmt) (3.4)
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Table 3.10: Mean operator own- and cross-price elasticities between 2010:Q4-2014Q:4
Kenya Safaricom Orange Essar Airtel
Safaricom -0.527 0.153 0.153 0.153
Orange 0.016 -0.505 0.016 0.016
Essar 0.016 0.016 -0.568 0.016
Airtel 0.027 0.027 0.027 -0.453
Ghana Glo Tigo Vodafone MTN Airtel Expresso
Glo -0.887 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026 0.026
Tigo 0.074 -0.929 0.074 0.074 0.074 0.074
Vodafone 0.108 0.108 -0.967 0.108 0.108 0.108
MTN 0.193 0.193 0.193 -0.668 0.193 0.193
Airtel 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 -0.788 0.047
Expresso 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 -1.123
Notes: Countries which implemented MNP after 2010.
The markups are calculated as (pjmt− cjmt/pjmt). Given that average price elasticities
are -1.23 for Botswana, -1.52 for Mozambique, -1.57 for Nigeria and -1.75 for South
Africa, the markups for these countries are on average are 53%, 42%, 62% and 58%,
respectively. The implied marginal costs are negative for Ghana, Kenya and Zambia,
since price elasticities are less than 1 in absolute terms. Thus, the elasticities of demand
may be under estimated on these countries, or Nash Bertrand equilibrium may not be the
correct assumption.
3.8 Conclusion
We constructed a unique quarterly panel data series for 28 mobile operators in seven
African countries for the period 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4, which we use to estimate a differ-
entiated products demand model based on the instrumental variables technique. We find
that the coefficient on price is significant and negative. Moreover, the interaction term
of price and a dummy variable for the implementation of MNP is also significant with a
negative sign. This implies that MNP increased price elasticity of demand in countries
which implemented this policy. At the same time, MNP has a significant and positive
impact on the utility which consumers derive from mobile services. This increases demand
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for mobile subscriptions.
We use the estimated parameters to compute average operator-specific price elastici-
ties. Our findings, suggest that the introduction of MNP increases own-price elasticities.
We find that they are on average higher in periods in which MNP was implemented.
However, in Ghana and Kenya, relative to other countries without a MNP policy in place,
the average own-price elasticities remained small, even after the implementation of MNP.
This may be attributed to the market structure and other factors in these two countries.
For instance, in Kenya, Safaricom dominates both the voice and mobile money markets.
Our results are thus an indication that MNP is not an ultimate solution for increasing
competition within the of mobile phone industry. Hence, it is important to understand
the sources of switching costs in order to apply the appropriate policy. For instance,
in markets where there is dominance with consumer valuation of network effects greater
than costs of switching, consumers are likely to be locked into a dominant operator. The
implementation of MNP will not be effective in this case.
An analysis of own-price elasticities at operator-level shows that in countries that have
implemented MNP prior to the period of our study, operator own price elasticity is higher
relative to those in countries without MNP. However, as for countries that have imple-
mented MNP within the period of our study, we find small operator own-price elasticities,
except for Expresso in Ghana. A comparison of own-price elasticities between countries
that implemented MNP in 2011 with countries that have never implemented MNP in
the period of our study shows that operators in countries that have never implemented
MNP have higher own-price elasticities relative to operators in Ghana and Kenya. These
findings have a number of implications. First, our results support the decision taken by
regulators in countries that never implemented MNP, given that the mobile telephone ser-
vices in those countries are elastic. Our results also show that MNP has differential effects
across countries and the impact of MNP is likely to be determined by market structure.
Hence, before implementing MNP, understanding of price elasticities and the sources of
switching costs is crucial.
Our study has admitted limitations which must be emphasized in the interest of future
research directions. The problem with the model used in this chapter, multinomial logit,
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is that own-price elasticities are proportional to own price. That is the lower the price,
the lower the estimated estimated own-price elasticities. This characteristic implies higher
markups for the lower priced products. Cross-price elasticities are entirely driven by one
parameter, market share and price of the service. With this characteristic, consumers
are assumed to substitute towards other mobile operators in proportion to market shares,
regardless of characteristics. We did not consider consumer welfare and therefore, we
cannot comment on the implications of decisions taken by the regulator on whether to
implement or not. Second, our study does not measure switching costs in the African
telecommunication market.
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Chapter 4
The Impact of Telecommunication
Regulatory Policy on Mobile Retail
Price in Sub-Saharan Africa
4.1 Introduction
Switching costs and mobile termination rates (MTRs) are the focal point of many telecom-
munication regulatory policies and antitrust cases.1 Switching costs bias consumers’
choices towards previously selected products and services. This, in turn, reduces their
responsiveness to price and allows firms to charge higher prices. In an effort to reduce
switching costs in mobile telecommunications markets, many regulatory authorities world-
wide introduced mobile number portability (MNP), which allows consumers to take their
mobile phone numbers with them when changing to a different mobile operator.
On the other hand, MTRs refer to charges which are set by mobile operators for
terminating calls on each others’ networks. Although the MTRs have a direct impact
on mobile retail prices, they are not observed by the consumers who make subscription
decisions without taking them into consideration. Therefore, each network is a de facto
monopoly for termination of calls, which can be a source of collusion.2 The regulatory
1Klemperer (1987a), Klemperer (1987b) and Klemperer (1987c) extensively discusses the theory of
switching costs. Switching costs refer to costs which inhibit consumers from changing products and
services, which in general allows firms to set prices above marginal costs. Grzybowski (2008b) states
that switching costs in the mobile telecommunication market arise from incompatability, transaction and
search costs.
2For example, a number of African regulatory authorities have adopted a glide path in MTR regu-
lation. This is a policy which requires operators to reduce the charges they set for terminating calls on
each other’s networks over time.
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authorities generally recognize this fact and intervene by regulating MTRs.
In spite of the importance of MNP and MTRs, we are not aware of any economic
literature which provides an assessment of the effect which these policies have on prices
and competition in low income countries. This gap in the literature is largely due to
the scarcity of data on the telecommunication market in these countries. Our study
contributes to the literature by examining the effect of MNP and MTRs on pre-paid
mobile phone service prices in Sub-Saharan African countries. Our approach is similar
to Parker & Ro¨ller (1997) and Grzybowski (2005) who, assuming that mobile services
are homogenous products, applied a static Cournot model to study competition in mobile
telecommunication market. In particular, Grzybowski (2005) analyzes the impact of MNP
on mobile retail prices for a number of European countries. However, in the estimation,
he does not control for country-specific MTRs as a determinant of marginal costs, but
instead uses country-specific cost dummies to take into account differences in marginal
costs between countries. In this study, we control for differences in marginal costs in terms
of country-specific MTRs.
We estimate a structural model of demand and supply using quarterly time series data
between 2010:Q4 and 2014:Q4 for eight African countries. The data was constructed by
aggregation of firm level information for 35 mobile operators which are active in these
countries.
On the supply side, we find that MTRs have a significant and positive impact on mobile
retail prices. On average a 10% increase (decrease) in MTRs will result in a 2.5% increase
(fall) in prices. Thus, pushing down the price in the regulated market, in other words,
the termination rate, does not increase unregulated mobile retail prices in the group of
countries used in this analysis. Our result supports the glide path termination rate policy.
A glide path in termination rate refers to regulated price control where regulators mandate
operators to reduce termination rate charges over time rather than an immediate move
to the cost-oriented level. This allows operators time to plan for the decreased revenue
from mobile termination charges. This policy is expected to offer stability as compared
to a one-off shock if the difference between the existing MTRs and the cost-orientated
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MTRs is great. 3 Moreover, we do not find that MNP has a significant negative impact
on retail prices for the selected African countries, which contrast with the results found by
Grzybowski (2005), Park (2011) and Cho et al. (2013) for European countries. This may
be due to less effective implementation of MNP in African countries and consequently
lower attractiveness and take up of this option by consumers. For instance, even though
it has been found that the effectiveness of MNP depends on porting time and charges,
the porting process in Africa is characterized by long porting time. Furthermore, in some
countries such as Nigeria, subscribers are not allowed to port again for the next three
months.
On the demand side, we find that MNP does not change the responsiveness of con-
sumers to price, a result which coincides with our findings on the supply side. This may
be due to the fact that in many African countries, it is common to use multiple sub-
scriber identity module (SIM) cards.4. Popular use of multiple SIM cards from different
operators has delayed the implementation of MNP, with the authority not convinced of
the facility’s economic benefits (see www.budde.com.au). A household survey, conducted
by ResearchICTAfrica in different African countries in 2008, reports that 36.3% of adult
mobile phone subscribers hold more than one SIM card in Benin, 25.8% in Kenya and
only 2.9% in Mozambique (see ResearchICTAfrica (2008)). Hence, many consumers are
connected to two or more operators with low demand for porting numbers. However,
these results contradict our finding in the prevous chapter. This could be due to the
use of different assumptions made when estimating the models. We estimate the price
elasticity of demand to be on average -0.27. We use the estimate of price elasticity to ap-
proximate the average market conduct parameter in the selected African countries, which
takes value of 1.29.
The remainder of this Chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 discusses theoretical and
empirical literature on MNP and MTRs. Section 4.3 provides an overview of MNP,
regulation and termination rates. Section 4.4 presents our data. Section 4.5 introduces the
3This policy has been implemented by a number of countries worldwide, including the United King-
dom, Botswana, Ghana, Kenya, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia
4Although in Botswana the population is estimated to be around 2 million, the number of active
SIM cards is about 3.5 million. For statistics on active SIM cards see http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-
D/Statistics/Pages/stat/default.aspx
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empirical model. Section 4.7 presents estimation results and finally Section 4.8 concludes.
4.2 Literature Review
There is a large theoretical literature on switching costs.5 Among the few empirical
studies that estimate the existence of switching costs in the telecommunication industry,
Grzybowski (2008b) uses a multinomial logit and a mixed logit approach based on stated
preferences to estimate switching cost in the UK mobile telephony market. His findings
suggest that the UK telecommunications market is characterized by significant switching
costs. In a later study, Grzybowski & Pereira (2011) use a series of multinomial and
mixed logit techniques on a panel data of Portuguese subscribers to test the existence
of switching costs in the mobile phone market. Similar to Grzybowski (2008b), they
find that switching costs are an important element of mobile telecommunications market
structure. However, these studies do not consider the impact of MNP on switching costs.
Another strand of literature studies switching costs in the context of number portabil-
ity. Some of these studies use individual level data to examine the effectiveness of MNP.
These studies find that the implementation of MNP significantly lowers switching costs
((Shy, 2002; Lee et al., 2006)). However, these studies do not provide evidence on how
MNP affects market outcomes. To fill this gap in the literature, Lyons et al. (2006) use
international time-series and cross-section data to test the impact of MNP on switching
costs. They find that MNP reduces switching costs when the switching process is rapid.
In countries where the switching process is slow, MNP does not reduce switching costs.
However, this study does not control for country specific porting charges and uses a five
day cutoff for MNP to be considered effective, which is arbitrary. Sa´nchez & Asimakopou-
los (2012) investigate the effectiveness of MNP in thirteen European countries using yearly
country level data for years 2000-2009. Similar to Lyons et al. (2006), they show that
MNP effectiveness is determined by both porting time and charges.
The aforementioned studies do not provide evidence on how prices and consumer
welfare changes in the presence of MNP. Shi et al. (2006) presents a theoretical model
for testing the impact of MNP on price and market concentration, and provide empirical
5See, for instance, Klemperer (1987a,b), Beggs & Klemperer (1992) and Chen & Rosenthal (1996).
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evidence. In support of other empirical studies, they find MNP has a negative impact on
prices. On the contrary, Shi et al. (2006) find that rather than helping small firms grow,
as intended, the introduction of MNP accelerates the process of market concentration.
This finding can be attributed to price discrimination across on-net and off-net charges.
A paper by Viard (2007) analyzes the impact of reducing switching costs when there
is a large proportion of new consumers. Using data on the toll-free service market, he
finds that a reduction of switching costs leads to less competition in the market. The
study concludes that the reduction of prices after the implementation of MNP implies
less competition.
Focusing on European mobile telecommunications, Cho et al. (2013) examine the
impact of MNP on price and market concentration. Using quarterly data for 47 mobile
operators in 15 countries between 1999-2006 they conclude that MNP reduces market
concentration by tightening price range and reduces large firms’ market share. Moreover,
when MNP is introduced smaller firms reduce prices more than large firms.
Nevertheless, Cho et al. (2013) state that prices of mobile phone services have been
declining over the past years. It is, therefore, hard to determine whether the introduction
of MNP contributed to this. They do not control for any other factors which might have
caused this decline. In this study we control for some factors that could have led to this
decline. Among the factors that could have contributed to a decline in mobile prices is
the reduction of MTRs, which are the main component of marginal costs. Over the past
decades, a number of regulatory authorities intervened in the MTRs market as a way of
reducing mobile retail prices. However, existing literature that examines the impact of
MNP on prices fails to account for MTRs in the empirical analysis.
Another branch of literature which relates to our study is the literature that examines
the impact of mobile termination rates on prices. Using panel data of mobile operators’
prices and profit margins, Genakos & Valletti (2011) test the waterbed effect in the mo-
bile telecommunication market. They find a negative relationship between fixed-to-mobile
termination rates and mobile retail prices. In a later study, Genakos & Valletti (2015)
re-evaluate the existence of the waterbed effect in the mobile phone market. Contrary to
their initial finding, their results predict a positive relationship between mobile-to-fixed
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termination rates and mobile retail prices. They attribute this result to changing telecom-
munication industry characteristics such as the reduction of fixed-line market share. The
focus of these two studies is on fixed-to-mobile termination rates.
Other studies focused on mobile-to-mobile termination rates. Using data on mobile
termination rates from 2001-2003, Dewenter & Haucap (2005) examine the effect of regu-
lating termination rates when networks have asymmetric sizes. They find that in markets
where consumers are ignorant about MTRs, smaller networks charge higher MTRs. They
also find that asymmetric regulation of larger operators induces smaller operators to in-
crease their termination rates. Their study, however, does not provide clear evidence on
how regulation of MTRs might affect retail prices and consumer welfare.
Cricelli et al. (2012) examine the economic justification of regulating MTRs. They
find that symmetric MTRs decreases lead to a reduction in retail prices and enhance
consumer welfare. Andersson et al. (2016) show that the increase in one operator’s MTR
increases its profitability, but when firms offer bundles with fixed-line an identical change
in all MTRs does not affect firms’ retail prices or profits. The shortcoming of this paper
is that, it does not provide evidence on whether reduction in MTRs will be an effective
instrument to reduce prices.
Grzybowski (2005) study is similar to ours in that it studies the impact of regulatory
policy including MNP on mobile retail prices in Europe. This study considers price as
a function of market power and marginal costs, where MNP is considered to influence
market power and other regulatory policies affect marginal costs. However, this analysis
does not include MTRs as a determinant of marginal costs, but relies on a set of country
specific dummy variables instead.
The contribution of this chapter is as follows. For our empirical analysis, we focus on
selected African countries for years 2010-2014. The most distinguishing part of our study
from prior work on MNP is that we estimate a demand and supply model which includes
MTRs and MNP among explanatory variables. We model MNP as a policy that affects
switching costs, while MTRs affect marginal costs.
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4.3 Telecommunications Policy in Africa
4.3.1 Mobile Number Portability
As of 2012, 73 countries have implemented MNP.6 The first county in Africa to introduce
MNP was South Africa in 2006. (Refer to Table 3.1 in Chapter 3).7
In contrast to industrialized countries, MNP has not reached its potential and its
performance has not been effective in Africa, with Ghana as the only exception. Although
Ghana launched its MNP scheme in 2011, until 2014 the number of successfully completed
ports amounted to 1,655,404. Among these ports a total of 832,202 were completed in
2014. As of 2014, after only 3 years, the total number of completed ports stood at 6% of
the total active mobile numbers. For comparison, it has taken 7 years for South Africa to
reach 5% porting rate.
A number of factors differentiate the MNP implementation in Ghana from the rest
of the African countries, which includes the speed of processing requests and the time
allowed to do another port after completing the previous one. By 2014, on average it
took 4 minutes and 16 seconds to complete the porting process. For comparison, in
Nigeria, the process took 48 working hours. In Ghana, the implementation of MNP has
brought changes in market shares. In particular, between 2011 and 2014, MTN, the
largest operator, lost 402,244 subscribers (a net loss of 3%), while the smaller operators
Tigo and Vodacom, gained 249,725 (6.2%) and 228,183 (3.4%) subscribers respectively.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, the MNP is only available in large markets, namely, South
Africa, Kenya and Nigeria. In Kenya, MNP policy was implemented in 2011 with the
objective of reducing Safaricom’s market power, which controlled more than 75% market
share at that time. Since the uptake of MNP has been low since inception, some market
6see mcclist.com
7The first country to adopt MNP is Singapore in 1997. However, this facility was only call forwarding
(see, (Bu¨hler & Haucap, 2004)). To use the facility, one had to have two mobile phone numbers at the
same time. A more structural MNP based on a centralized data base was introduced in the UK , Hong
Kong, and the Netherlands as early as 1999 (Cho et al., 2013). Singapore adopted a structured MNP in
2008 (Cho et al., 2013). The benefits of MNP has been widely seen in Turkey. Since the implementation of
MNP in 2008, Turkcell has been consistently loosing its subscribers to rivals Avea and Vodafone. Turkcell
attributed this trend to the fact that its competitors continued to push for lower prices and offered high
incentives through bundled packages which in combination with the ease of switching operators via MNP
led to the operator’s market share declining from 56% in 2008 to 51% in 2013 (see gsmaintelligence.com)
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specialists have labeled it a failed policy. The request for porting peaked in January 2012,
but thereafter declined to reach its lowest level in November 2013. A gradual increase in
demand for ports was later registered in January 2014. However, the policy had an impact
on operators’ market shares. By 2014, small companies gained substantial market share
from the dominant operator, Safaricom. The market share of Safaricom subsequently
reduced from 79% to 68%, with the other three companies owning the remaining 32%.
A number of factors contribute to unsuccessful performance of MNP in Africa. For
instance, in South Africa the regulator awarded the licence of operating MNP to a com-
pany owned by one of the operators. As such, the results of porting is prone to being
unduly influenced by that operator. The Nigerian MNP is also far from being a success.
The poor performance of the policy in Nigeria could be due to long porting time and the
fact that consumers are not allowed to port again for the next three months. Though
Nigeria has a much larger subscription base, the number of ports amounted to 115,000,
compared to 363,000 ports in Ghana.8
4.3.2 Mobile Termination Rates
Termination rates are prices that carriers charge for terminating or completing calls on
each others’ network. These charges form part of operators’ cost of providing calls to
its customers. These rates may be commercially negotiated or may be regulated. In
some countries, the regulator only facilitates termination negotiations but cannot set
termination charges. The regulator only set termination rates when operators fail to
reach an agreement.
The approach to regulating MTRs adopted by most regulatory authorities allows for
total cost recovery based on fully allocated cost models (Harbord & Pagnozzi, 2010).
In Kenya, for instance, the authority regulates termination charges using a pure-long-
run incremental cost (pure-LRIC). In Botswana, the authority uses long-run incremental
charges plus (LRIC+). This approach has been adopted by Ofcom in the UK. In both
schemes, the regulators set cost by comparing calculated costs to a hypothetical efficient
new entrant. The difference between these two approaches is in the calculation costs with
8All the African number portability statistics come from this article : www.balancingact-africa
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the pure-LRIC considering the marginal costs while under the LRIC+, the regulator sets
termination rates based on detailed costs which include common costs.
The main reason for regulating termination rates is to avoid a welfare distortion in
the structure of price. If left unregulated, operators might be incentivized to exploit their
monopoly power in call termination to gain excessive profits. These profits may in turn
be used to subsidize subscriber acquisition costs (Harbord & Pagnozzi, 2008). This is an
issue that is frequently discussed in the waterbed effects theory, whereby an increase in
termination rates leads to a decline in retail prices (Armstrong & Wright, 2009).
However, a number of regulatory authorities have been taken to court over termination
rates. In South Africa, for instance, Cell C summoned the regulator to court claiming
that the way that Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) set
termination rates is an acknowledgement that the duopoly that exists in South Africa
is acceptable and should be allowed to continue.9 Cell C’s proposition was that, the
regulator must implement an asymmetric termination rates system in which the two
largest operator (MTN and Vodacom) terminate Cell C calls at a price lower than that
which Cell C charges.
In 2009, MTN Uganda through court proceeding, blocked the regulator from imposing
new reduced termination rates. Their argument was that the regulator should only facili-
tate discussion, but not impose an outcome on the companies. MTN argued that the only
time the regulator should intervene is when the operators themselves cannot come to an
agreement. As of 2011, MTN Uganda threatened to stop accepting phone calls from its
network to Uganda Telecom (UTL) over claims of unpaid bills for termination charges.10
4.4 Data
We estimate demand and supply specifications using a unique quarterly time series data
between 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4 for eight African countries: Botswana, Ghana, Kenya,
Mozambique, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Zambia. The sampled countries were
selected based on market characteristics, wholesale regulatory policies and availability of
9http://www.moneyweb.co.za/uncategorized/icasa-finalises-new-call-termination-rates/
10http://www.cellular-news.com/story/Operators/48234.php
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data. For instance, all countries in the sample have adopted a glide path termination rates
policy. We do not include North African countries in our sample due to their differences
in the market industry characteristics. North African countries adopt the Arab telecom-
munication standards and in some instance their calls are terminated in other countries
such as France.
Countries with monopoly and those that have licensed only two operators were also
not considered in the sample on the basis that they are less likely to adopt MNP. To
be precise, countries with one operators, such as Ethiopia and Swaziland, cannot adopt
MNP, while those with two operators are likely not to implement this facility due to high
costs. The cost of operating an MNP facility are likely to be higher than the benefits to
subscribers in markets with a small number of operators. Furthermore, our sample is also
determined by the availability and consistency of data. For instance, MTRs data is very
scarce and were able to collect MTRs for nine countries. We could not include Uganda
in the sample due to price data inconsistencies.
The data was constructed by aggregation of firm level information for 35 mobile opera-
tors which are active in the selected countries. Data on pre-paid retail prices was gathered
from Research ICT Africa (RIA), while operators’ pre-paid subscriber base and population
were obtained from World Cellular Information Services (WICS). Fixed line subscriptions
were obtained from the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). We used different
data sources to gather termination rates data. The data sources are presented in Chapter
3, Table 3.2.
The variables used in the study can be grouped into regulatory and non-regulatory.
The regulatory variables include: country-level mobile termination rates (MTRs) in US$PPP
and a dummy variable for the implementation of mobile number portability (MNP)in a
country. The non-regulatory variables are pre-paid mobile subscriptions (Subs), popula-
tion (Pop), GDP per capita (GDP) in US$PPP, mobile retail prices for pre-paid services
in US$PPP and fixed penetration (Fixed). We transform the variables Subs, Pop, GDP
and Fixed using logarithms. They are then used as explanatory variables in the demand
equation. These variables were also used in previous studies, see for instance Gruber &
Verboven (2001) and Grzybowski (2005). Table 4.1 presents summary statistics of the
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above discussed variables.
Table 4.1: Simple Statistics
Variable N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Price 136 5.272 3.224 1.299 16.86
Pop(’000000) 136 48.100 49.700 1.978 181
rates 136 0.099 0.040 0.038 0.203
Subscr(’000000) 136 34.300 34.300 2.456 137
GDP(’000) 136 5.800 4.778 0.895 15.991
1/N 136 0.254 0.068 0.167 0.333
Fixed 136 2.451 3.346 0.100 9.450
Price*MNP 136 1.541 2.162 0 7.308
time 136 9 4.917 1 17
MNP 136 0.441 0.498 0 1
An important variable when estimating demand in the mobile industry is subscriptions.
One of the main shortcoming of the existing empirical literature is on its inability to
distinguish subscribers. For instance, Parker & Ro¨ller (1997) use the total number of cells
in a given network to proxy for subscriptions. Recent studies use mobile penetration or
total subscriptions to proxy subscriptions (see, for instance Grzybowski (2005); Cho et al.
(2013)). The problem with these measures is that penetration rate does not distinguish
between pre-paid and post-paid subscribers. Hence, the results of these studies might be
biased given the fact that post-paid and pre-paid plans are priced differently. Furthermore,
the use of penetration rate or number of cells per network tends to capture registered
subscribers who might not be active.
Our data is interesting as it uses new and unique subscription data, which is generally
not available for African countries. The data contains firm-level subscriber information,
which is disaggregated into pre-paid and post-paid plans.11 In contrast to developed
economies, mobile subscriptions in Africa are largely pre-paid. For instance, while in
North America and Northwestern Europe the share of post-paid subscriptions is 75%, in
Africa, only 4% of subscribers are on post-paid.12 Our study uses information on pre-paid
11Generally, mobile operators offer two types of subscription plans, pre-paid and post-paid. Pre-paid
subscriptions require pre-payment and does not require a contract. The post-paid allows post-payment
for services which requires a contract for a minimum of one month.
12see www.globalrewardsolutions.com
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mobile subscriptions in the demand estimation.
The frequency of mobile phone service usage is very critical when analysing subscrip-
tions. For instance, the use of total registered subscriptions, which merely relate to the
total number of connections that have been registered with an operator, might be mis-
leading since some of the registered connections might be inactive. In contrast to the
existing studies, we use the total number of active connections in regular use on a net-
work as subscriptions. Figure 4.1 shows trends of total active pre-paid subscription for
each country for the period of the study.
Figure 4.1: Pre-paid Mobile Subscriptions for Selected African Countries (millions)
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Over the period of the study, the pre-paid subscriptions were growing rapidly. In-
novations within the industry have led to development of new services, such as mobile
banking, mobile Internet and the provision of over the top services, such as Voice over
Internet Protocol (VoiP) and Skype. These changes were mainly supported by techno-
logical shifts, such as movements from second generation (2G) to third generation (3G)
and recently to fourth generation (4G) or the long term evolution. To account for these
technological advances, we use a common time trend variable (Time). This variable can
be interpreted as a constant upgrade in the quality of service, the rising range of available
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services, as well as enhanced performance of mobile telecommunication services.
On the supply side we use two types of explanatory variables to explain the prices of
mobile pre-paid calls (Prices): (i) exogenous determinants of markup and (ii) determinants
of marginal cost. As for the exogenous price shifters we use MNP, which is expected to
have a negative effect on price. This is because MNP is expected to reduce switching
costs and, thereby, increase consumer responsiveness to price. To capture the impact of
MNP on markup, we interact it with the inverse of number of operators. The inverse of
the number of firms variable comes into the supply function through our derivation of the
supply equation, as shown in subsection 4.5. Grzybowski (2005) also uses the inverse of
the number of firms and MNP as explanatory variables, but he does not attribute MNP
to the market power component.
Another important determinant of price is the marginal cost. Data on marginal cost
is in general not available to researchers. A number of studies turn to proxies for it
using bond rate, labour costs and electricity costs (see, for instance, Grzybowski (2005)).
However, some of these proxies are not specific to the telecommunication industry. In our
study, we use the mobile termination rate, which is a better proxy for telecommunication
marginal costs and is expected to have a positive effect on prices.
In order to obtain homogeneous comparisons of termination across the selected coun-
tries, we collected average rates per minute calls. We further transformed the rates from
local currencies to US$ PPP using the World Bank PPP conversion factor. Figure 4.2
shows evolution of termination rates in the selected countries. The figure reveals that in
all the countries considered in this study, MTRs are falling. This is because the countries
considered in this study have adopted glide path termination rate policy. This policy
requires operators to reduce termination rates.
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Figure 4.2: Mobile Termination Rates for Selected Countries, 2010-2014.
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4.4.1 Mobile Pricing
Measuring the prices of pre-paid telecommunication services is complex. The price is
determined using tariffs of a wide range of services including voice, SMS and data. Adding
to the complexity is the fact that mobile customers are billed based on destination and
timing of their calls. The phone calls can be made on- or off-net and during peak or
off-peak hours.
Due to this complexity, studies that analyze pricing of mobile telecommunication turn
to use different measures for prices of mobile phone services. For instance, Shy (2002) uses
average revenue per user (ARPU), while Grajek (2010) uses the lowest average customer
bill. On the other hand, Fuentelsaz et al. (2012) and Cho et al. (2013) use price per minute.
Price per minute measure is computed by dividing ARPU by the average monthly minutes
of usage (MOU).
The problem with the measures used by Shy (2002), Grajek (2010), Fuentelsaz et al.
(2012) and Cho et al. (2013) is that they do not take into consideration the different timing
and destinations of phone calls. Other studies construct a price for mobile phone services
using information on usage profiles (see, for instance, Grzybowski (2008a); Doganoglu &
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Grzybowski (2013)). These studies assume that a representative user makes a certain
number of phone calls per month, which are distributed across time and networks accord-
ing to certain assumptions. The cost of the usage basket represents the price of mobile
services. We take a similar approach to these studies and use as price the cost of pre-paid
mobile phone service usage basket, which was constructed by RIA using the Teligen Ltd
approach.13 Table 3.3 presents the assumed distribution of minutes and messages for
pre-paid services according to destination and time of the day are presented in Chapter
3, Table 3.3.
We construct price by weighting the price of each firm by its market share. We use
average weighted price per country to proxy the price of pre-paid mobile phone services.
Prices are measured in US$ PPP. We show price trends for each country for the period of
the study in Figure 4.3. Similar to the MTRs, prices for mobile phone services have been
falling over the period of the study.
Figure 4.3: Mobile Prices for Selected Countries, 2010:Q4-2014:Q4
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13For more details on the basket see www.oecd.org
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4.5 Econometric Model
We assess the impact of MNP and MTR on mobile retail price using the equilibrium
model proposed by Green & Porter (1984) and later, used by Parker & Ro¨ller (1997)
and Grzybowski (2005) in the application to telecommunications industry. We assume
that firms produce homogenous products and compete in quantities. This assumption
is supported by the fact that the telecommunication output is constrained by spectrum
availability, and as such firms strategically set subscriptions to sell. Subject to certain
conditions, the capacity constrained price game yields the same output as the Cournot
quantity game as shown in (Kreps & Scheinkman, 1983).
Following Grzybowski (2005), we assume that mobile operators are faced with the
following inverse demand function:
pts = f
( N∑
i=1
qits, Xts, ts
)
, (4.1)
where i = 1, ..., N is the mobile operator subscript, s = 1, ..., S is the country subscript ,
t = 1, ..., T is the time subscript, Nts is the number of mobile operators in country s at
time t, pts is the average price of pre-paid mobile phone service in country s at time t,
qits is total active subscriptions of mobile operator i in country s at time t, Xts represents
observable and ts the unobservable demand shifters. Firms are assumed to have the
following similar cost structure as follows:
TCits = FCits + V C(qits),Wts, ωts), (4.2)
with FCits representing firm specific fix costs changing over time and across countries.
Variable costs, V C(qits), depend on the number of network subscriptions and some other
country-specific cost drivers Wts. Unobservable cost shifters are captured by ωts. Given
such demand and cost specifications, a firm’s profit function can be expressed as:
piits = pts(.)qits − V C(qits,Wts, ωts)− FCits, (4.3)
this provides the first order conditions in the form:
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λits
∂pts(.)
∂qits
qits + pts(.)−MCits(.) = 0, (4.4)
where MCits(.) =
∂V Cits
∂qits
is the marginal cost function for firm i in country s and λits =
1 +
∑N
j 6=1(
∂qjts(.)
∂qits
) represents conjectual variation (degree of collusion). The conjectual
variation formulation might be interpreted as the firm’s expectations about the reaction
of the other firms to a change in quantity (see Bresnahan (1989); Grzybowski (2005)).
Summing up FOCs (4.4) over all firms within the industry and dividing by the number
of firms Nts to get the average industry supply equation in the form:
λits
Nts
∂pts(.)
∂Qts
Qts + pts(.)− 1
Nts
N∑
i=1
MCits(.) = 0. (4.5)
Three basic cases can be considered: λts = 0 in the perfect competition case, λts = 1
corresponds to Nash equilibrium and λts = Nts implies joint profit maximization.
In the estimation, we assume that MTRs affect prices through marginal costs and MNP
is assumed to influence prices by affecting price elasticities and firms’ market power. This
is because MNP is expected to give consumers an opportunity to switch without losing
their mobile numbers which reduced switching costs. Based on the above assumption, we
estimate the following demand specifications:
Qts = exp(−(α0 + α1Rts)pts +Xtsβ + ts), (4.6)
where Qts is the sum of mobile subscriptions of all operators in country s at time t , pts
represents the price of pre-paid services, Xts = [1, F ixedts, GDPts, Popts, T imet] is a set
of exogenous explanatory variables and ts represents the unobservable demand shifters.
Given the above demand specification we get ∂pts(.)
∂Qts
= 1−(α0+α1Rts)Qts . Hence, the supply
side equation becomes:
pts(.) =
1
Nts
λts
(α0 + α1Rts)
+MCts(.)γ + ωts. (4.7)
where Rts = [MNPts] is an exogenous regulatory variables which affects market power.
In this specification, MCts = [MTRts, T imet] and Nts is the number of firms in country s
at time t. We assume that the telecommunication market is similar across African states
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with the same collusion parameter λts and ωts are the unobservable cost shifters. This
is a strong assumption which we make due to limitations in our data. We do not have
enough data points to estimate country-specific parameters. However, this assumption
is not far-fetched as there are similarities in the African telecommunication markets.
For instance, first-movers tend to dominate the mobile telecommunication market. In
terms of ownership, the government have ownership of incumbent operators. In terms of
regulation of MTRs, regulatory authorities follow a glide path. Furthermore, the African
mobile telecommunication markets have similar firms. For instance, MTN provides its
networks in the following countries: Botswana, Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia.
Airtel operates in Ghana, Kenya, Zambia, while Orange operates in Botswana and Kenya.
The pricing equation is nonlinear in parameters. The price elasticity of demand for the
demand function in equation 4.6 is given by:
ηts =
∂Qts
∂pts
pts
Qts
= −(α0 + α1Rts)pts. (4.8)
4.6 Identification
An important factor when examining the impact of a policy on an outcome is to un-
derstand the motivation behind the introduction of such a legislative initiative. As for
our case, understanding the motivation behind the implementation of MNP and the glide
path in termination rate policy are critical as we seek to tease out the impact of these
policies on price. If the implementation of these policies were endogenous to market
characteristics, the unbiased impact of these initiatives on prices will be hard to estimate.
Similar to other empirical studies that examine the impact of MNP on price, we
consider the introduction of MNP as an exogenous policy to reduce switching costs. In
practice, the authorities stipulate stringent implementation dates, and mobile telecommu-
nication agents (consumers and operators) consider it as a given external shifter of market
condition (see, for instance, Bu¨hler et al. (2006); Park (2011); Cho et al. (2013)). As long
as pricing strategies developed by mobile carriers do not influence the implementation of
MNP, we can treat the policy as an exogenous factor with respect to operators’ pricing
decisions. We present this in greater detail here by discussing the background of MNP
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adoption.
In most countries, the regulator’s decision to implement MNP is based on the mo-
tive to facilitate market competition by decreasing market power of the incumbent. For
instance, in South Korea, the authority adopted MNP because the regulator assessed
that the incumbent was exploiting excessive profits by introducing a 3-digit identification
prefix, an appealing point and a differentiated value ((Cho et al., 2013)). In terms of
MNP adoption in African countries, however, the major difference from other countries
is that the regulator’s decision on whether to adopt MNP or not cannot be attributed to
market characteristics. For instances, most African authorities did not implement MNP
even though the telecommunications market is dominated by incumbent operators. The
decision not to implement MNP in Botswana and Uganda, for example, was based on the
costs of implementing the facility.14 Hence, the adoption of MNP in Africa is likely to be
based on external conditions rather than on internal market conditions.15
We also consider the setting of termination rates to be influenced by external factors
and not to be endogenous to retail prices. In practice, the mobile sector is made up
of two markets: the wholesale or upstream and the retail or downstream market. In the
upstream market network providers sell termination services. In setting termination rates,
regulators generally assume that call termination on each individual mobile network is
a separate market and each operator in that market is a monopoly. To prevent market
distortions, regulators impose remedies by requiring operators to set cost-oriented prices
for call termination. For instance, when implementing the glide path termination rate
policy, the regulators used a cost-based model assuming, a hypothetical efficient entrant.
In addition, the rate at which the termination reduces is determined by the regulators
and the operators take it as given. Furthermore, what makes this policy exogenous is
that after realizing that mobile operators are setting termination rates that are not cost-
orientated, the regulators mandated the operators to reduce termination charges over
time, rather than mandate a one-off shock which will reflect market conditions. Hence,
the setting of termination rate in Africa is likley to be based on exogenous factors rather
14(see www.budde.com.au, www.cellular-news.com)
15For instance, in countries where MNP is implemented, market agents (operators and subscribers)
do not have any influence in its adoption. Instead, this was at the discretion of the regulator.
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than endogenous market conditions.
4.7 Results
We estimate the demand and supply sides separately using panel data random effects tech-
niques. This estimation strategy relies on the assumption that the unobserved product-
level errors are uncorrelated with explanatory variables. However, this assumption may
not hold due to endogeneity of price and quantity variables. We perform a Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test of endogeneity, which does not allow rejecting endogeneity of price in the
demand estimation. A standard way of solving this problem is to use instrumental vari-
ables estimation. The literature suggests using cost variables as instruments for price
(see, for instance, Berry (1994)). Hence, in this study we use termination rates, which are
the main components of operators’ marginal costs, to instrument for retail prices. The
use of panel data techniques require testing whether the error term are correlated with
the regressor. We perform a Hausman test, which allows us to reject the null hypothesis
of random effects in favour of panel data fixed effects technique. However, our model
estimation requires inclusion of a country-level inverse of number of firms variable in the
supply side. Hence, using panel data fixed effects model omits this variable. The results
of panel data fixed and random effects techniques are practically similar, for the demand
estimation.16 This gives us a reason to discuss the results from a panel data random
effects techniques.17
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 present the result of estimating the supply side and demand formu-
lations respectively. On the supply side, N represents the number of firms in a country,
MNP/N is the interaction of MNP with the inverse number of firms. rates represents
mobile termination rates and time is the time trend measured in quarters. In column (1)
of Table 4.3, we present the results of estimating a demand equation using standard panel
16The magnitude of coefficients in price and time are similar and significant in both fixed effects and
random effects estimation strategies. However, the fixed effects model, population loose its significance
17One way of solving this problem is to use simultaneous equations techniques. Unfortunately our data
cannot handle this type of estimation as we do not have enough exogenous variables to identify parameters.
Though our estimation strategy might not be efficient, our results are consistent. Furthermore, our
strategy have an advantage over system estimation in the sense that if one equation is misspecified, it
would not spill over and contaminate the estimation results for the other equation.
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random effects, while column (2) presents the result of estimating the same model with
instrumental variable techniques. We interpret the results in column (2).
Overall, the demand estimation has a much better fit than the supply estimation. Sig-
nificant exogenous variables in the demand estimations explain about 86% of the variation
in subscriptions, while on the supply side they only explain 46% of price variation. These
results show that there is much more unexplained noise in the pricing policies than in the
consumers’ decision to purchase mobile phone services. Much of these unexplained vari-
ations might be attributed to the fact that the model used assumes static interactions,
while firms in this industry apply dynamic strategies. Moreover, some other variables
such as regulatory issues are unobservable or difficult to approximate and implement in
the model. Furthermore, each country seems to have a specific competitive environment.
In the supply side specification, MTRs have a positive and significant impact on mobile
retail prices, which suggests that lowering the MTRs leads to a reduction in mobile retail
prices. A decline in average MTR of 10%, decreases average mobile retail prices by
2.5%.18 Our results are in support of the glide path termination rate policy. Moreover, our
study finds that there is no significant impact of MNP on retail price, which opposes the
hypothesis that MNP reduces price by reducing switching costs. We attribute this result
to African industry characteristics such as ownership of multiple SIM cards (see, Aker &
Mbiti (2010); Jentzsch (2012)). Subscribers in developing countries adopt multiple SIM
cards to overcome poor network coverage and to avoid network congestion. Subscribers
also connect to multiple operators to save money by making on-net calls and also to benefit
from discounted or bundled tariffs for voice calls or for data (see Sutherland (2009)). In
markets with multiple SIM cards, there is no need for porting numbers since consumers
subscribe to more than one operator. Moreover, as we discussed earlier, the speed of
processing a request for porting is very low in the countries considered in this analysis.
We also find MNP to be insignificant in the estimation of the demand equation. This
coincides with the supply side estimation.
18We calculate the impact of MTRs on retail price as ∂pts∂ratests
ratests
pts
= γ ratespts
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Table 4.2: The Supply Side
VARIABLES Price
1/N 24.397***
(4.221)
MNP/N -0.962
(2.076)
Rates 10.677**
(5.371)
Time -0.155***
(0.038)
Constant -0.532
(1.299)
Observations 136
R- square 0.45
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Results
based on panel data random effects estimation.
Our model specification requires the inclusion of inverse number of firms (1/N) in the
supply side formulation. The coefficient of this variable is interpreted as market conduct
divided by the coefficient of price. The inverse number of firms variable has a significant
and positive effect on price, which implies that as the number of firms in the market
increases, market power is reduced and prices decline. The market conduct parameter
is estimated around 1.27, which is calculated as 24.39 multiplied by 0.05. The value of
this parameter in the proximity of one implies Cournot competition conduct. Thus, the
average market conduct in sub-Saharan African countries during the period of the study
is approximated by the Nash equilibrium.
Similar to Grzybowski (2005), we include a time trend in our analysis of demand and
supply. The coefficient of this variable should be interpreted as the effect of technological
progress. The coefficient of time trend in the supply equation is negative and signifi-
cant. This result suggests that technological progress leads to a reduction in prices. We
find a significant positive effect of time trend on subscriptions. This result shows that
technological progress increases customer valuation of mobile phone services.
On the demand side, population has a significant positive effect on mobile subscriptions
across the selected African countries, which implies that demand for mobile services is
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greater in populated countries. We find insignificant impact of GDP per capita and
fixed penetration on demand for mobile phone services. The demand for pre-paid mobile
telephone service is inelastic with respect to price. The price elasticity of demand for pre-
paid mobile telephone services is -0.27, which agrees with estimates from other countries.
This result contradicts the results found in Chapter 3. In Chapter 3, we find elastic price
elasticities. We attribute this to different assumptions made in each chapter.
Table 4.3: The Demand Side
VARIABLES 1 2
Price -0.056*** -0.052***
(0.007) (0.006)
Price*MNP 0.024 -0.006
(0.015) (0.035)
ln(Pop) 0.800*** 0.202***
(0.029) (0.064)
ln(Fixed) 0.008 -0.021
(0.013) (0.025)
Time 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.002) (0.003)
ln(GDP) 0.307*** 0.210
(0.055) (0.174)
MNP 0.070 0.087
(0.052) (0.088)
Constant 0.632 11.870***
(0.723) (1.900)
Observations 136 136
R-square 0.83 0.87
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Re-
sults based on panel data random effects estimation in column (1) and based on
instrumental variables random effects estimation in column (2). We use mobile
termination rate and mobile termination rate interacted with MNP as instru-
ments. The dependent variable is logarithm of mobile subscriptions.
4.8 Conclusions
This chapter examined the impact of mobile number portability and mobile termination
rate on mobile retail price in selected African countries. MNP reallocates property rights
of mobile phone number from carriers to customers. By doing so, it allows consumers to
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keep their numbers when changing operators. Theory relating to switching costs suggest
that prices can increase or decrease when switching costs reduce. Termination rates,
on the other hand are charges which operators set for terminating calls on each others’
network. These charges are not observed by customers, but they directly affect retail
prices. Existing theory suggests that a decrease in MTR is more likely to increase mobile
retail prices and reduce fixed-line prices. This phenomenon is called the waterbed effect.
We use a Nash equilibrium model proposed by Green & Porter (1984) to examine
the effect of regulatory policies on mobile retail prices. Firms are assumed to produce
a homogenous good and use static interactions. Using a unique quarterly dataset for 35
mobile phone operators in eight African countries for the period 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4, we
estimate demand and supply structural formulation separately using random effects panel
data techniques.
First, we find that mobile termination rates (MTR) have a statistically significant
positive impact on mobile retail prices, a result that rejects the waterbed effect in support
of the glide path termination rate policy. This result contradicts the study by Genakos
& Valletti (2011), which was used by one of the largest firms in the UK, Vodafone, to
argue against regulatory authority policy of reducing termination rates. Vodacom cited
the paper and argued that reduction of termination rates will lead to an increase in
mobile retail prices and reduction in subscriptions. Our results show that a decrease in
termination rate will lower mobile retail prices. It thus supports the glide path termination
rate policy.
Second, our results oppose the hypothesis that MNP reduces prices and firms’ markups.
Both on the demand and supply side we find that MNP is insignificant. Although this
policy might have an effective impact in industrialized countries, the same might not be
true for developing countries. For instance, the African mobile telecommunication mar-
ket is characterized by multiple SIM card ownership and the existence of dual SIM card
mobile phone devices. Hence consumers are connected to at least two operators meaning
that there is little demand for porting numbers.
Our study come with some limitations. The constructed data set does not allow us
to determine whether MNP reduces switching costs or not. We were unable to determine
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how firms’ market share evolve after the introduction of MNP. This is because we use
aggregated data. Furthermore, we were unable to get firm level termination rates, which
could have allowed us to evaluate the impact of regulating termination rates on small and
large firms. Future research must evaluate the effect of MNP and on market concentration
and price demand elasticities.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
The deployment of mobile telecommunications provides an avenue for developing countries
to overcome one of the main constraints to economic growth, such as, poor or non-existent
physical and service infrastructure. In particular, mobile phones provide low income
households with access to services which are in general not available to them such as
financial services.
In Chapter 2 we analyze the determinants of adoption of mobile phones and mobile
financial services. For this purpose, we combine two unique datasets. The first one con-
tains information about access to mobile phones and the use of mobile phone services by
13,814 individuals in eleven Sub-Saharan African countries in 2011. Information on mo-
bile service includes the use of mobile money, transfers and social and Internet activities.
To approximate the availability of service infrastructure we complement the survey data
with nighttime light intensity data which enables us to analyze how spatial differences in
infrastructure development across Sub-Saharan African countries influence the adoption
and use of mobile phone services by individuals.
Our results suggest that the adoption of mobile phones is higher in areas with bet-
ter physical infrastructure. However, in the group of mobile phone adopters, the use of
mobile phones for mobile money and transfers is negatively influenced by the level of
infrastructure. Thus, mobile money can be considered as a substitute to physical infras-
tructure and benefits people who live in remote areas and who may be excluded from
access to financial services. This result confirms the benefits that mobile phones have for
social inclusion and economic development in low income countries with poor physical
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infrastructure. These results are consistent with the view that mobile phones improve the
livelihoods of remote area residents by providing them with access to financial services,
which are otherwise not available physically. Moreover, we find that while individuals
with higher disposable income are more likely to adopt mobile phones, the level of income
does not determine use of mobile money and transfers. At the same time, higher income
groups are more likely to use mobile phones for social and Internet activities. This result
suggests that all income groups benefit equally from mobile money and transfer services.
Even though our analysis only involves a number of low income countries in Sub-Saharan
Africa, our finding on the use of mobile phones to overcome infrastructure deficiencies is
more general. In high income countries, mobile phone users are able to save time and
money by having mobile access to financial and other services.
While Chapter 2 we analyze the determinants of mobile phone adoption and usage,
Chapter 3 and 4 focuses on the effect of telecommunication regulatory policies on demand
price elasticities and price. Concerns have been raised by various competition and regula-
tory authorities about the lack of effective competition in the mobile telecommunication
industry. Limitations in the amount of spectrum and high network investments result in
the industry being oligopolistic in nature and susceptible to collusion and the exercise of
market power. In addition, consumers of mobile phone services tend to have high switch-
ing costs, which may weaken competition among existing firms and make successful entry
of new firms difficult. Moreover, the increasing demand for mobile broadband services
and scarcity of spectrum has already led to rapid consolidation in some markets. Hence,
antitrust regulators are faced with tough choices as they balance their mandate of attain-
ing healthy competition with the financial imperatives facing the industry. To improve
access and usage of mobile phone services and to ensure that customers are not exploited,
a number of regulatory authorities have adopted a number of policies that are meant to
reduce mobile retail price and reduce switching costs as well as increase competition. To
reduce switching costs, regulatory authorities worldwide introduced mobile MNP which
allows subscribers to move with their numbers when changing mobile operator. However,
they have repeatedly intervened in the mobile termination rates (MTRs) market and im-
plemented a policy that requires operators to reduce the charges they set for terminating
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calls on each other’s network over time.
Chapter 3, uses a unique quarterly panel datast for 28 mobile operators in seven
African countries for the period 2010Q4 to 2014Q4 to estimate a differentiated products
demand model based on instrumental variables technique. Consistent with theory we
find a negative relationship between price and utility. Moreover, the interaction term of
price and a dummy variable for the implementation of MNP is also significant with a
negative sign. This implies that the introduction of MNP increased price elasticities in
countries which implemented the policy. At the same time, MNP has a significant and
positive impact on the utility that consumers derive from mobile services. This increases
the demand for mobile subscriptions.
We use the estimated parameters to compute average operator-specific price elastici-
ties. Our findings, suggest that the introduction of MNP increases own-price elasticities.
We find that they are on average higher in periods in which MNP was implemented.
However, in Ghana and Kenya, the average own-price elasticities remained small even af-
ter the implementation of MNP relative to other countries without MNP policy in place.
This may be attributed to market structure and other factors in these two countries.
For instance, in Kenya, Safaricom dominates both the voice and mobile money markets.
Thus, our results are an indication that MNP is not the ultimate solution for increasing
competitiveness of the mobile industry. For this reason, it is important to understand
the sources of switching costs in order to apply the appropriate policy. For instance, in
markets where there is dominance with consumer valuation of network effects greater than
the costs of switching, consumers are likely to be locked within a dominant operator. The
implementation of MNP will not be effective in this case.
An analysis of own-price elasticities at operator-level shows that in countries that have
implemented MNP prior to the period of our study, operator own price elasticities are
higher relative to those in countries without MNP. As for countries that have implemented
MNP within the scope of our study, we find small operator own-price elasticities, except
for Expresso in Ghana. A comparison of own-price elasticities between countries that im-
plemented MNP in 2011, with countries that have never implemented MNP in the period
of our study shows that operators in countries that have never implemented MNP have
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higher own-price elasticities relative to operators in Ghana and Kenya. These findings
have a number of implications. Our results show that MNP has differential effects across
countries and the impact of MNP is likely to be determined by market structure. Hence,
before implementing MNP, understanding of price elasticities and the sources of switching
costs is crucial.
Chapter 4 examines the impact of mobile number portability and mobile termination
rates on mobile retail prices in selected African countries. MNP is a facility that reallocates
property rights of mobile phone number from carriers to customers. By doing so, it
allows consumers to keep their numbers when changing operators. Theory relating to
switching costs suggests that prices can increase or decrease when switching costs reduce.
Termination rates, on the other hand, are charges which operators set for terminating calls
on each others’ network. These charges are not observed by customers, but they directly
affect retail prices. Existing theory suggests that a decrease in MTR is more likely to
lead to an increase in mobile retail prices and reduce fixed-line prices. This phenomenon
is called the waterbed effect.
We use a Nash equilibrium model proposed by Green & Porter (1984) to examine
the effect of regulatory policies on mobile retail prices. Firms are assumed to produce a
homogeneous good and use static interactions. Using a unique quarterly dataset for 35
mobile phone operators in eight African countries for the period 2010:Q4 to 2014:Q4, we
separately estimate demand and supply structural formulation using random effects panel
data techniques.
First, we find that mobile termination rates (MTR) have a statistically significant
positive impact on mobile retail prices, a result that rejects the waterbed effect in support
of the glide path termination rate policy. This result contradicts the study by Genakos &
Valletti (2011), which was used by one of the largest firms in the UK, Vodafone, to argue
against regulatory policy of reducing termination rates. Vodacom cited the paper and
argued that reduction of termination rates will lead to an increase in mobile retail prices
and reduction in subscriptions. Our results show that a decrease in termination rates will
lower mobile retail prices. It thus support the glide path termination rate policy.
Second, our results oppose the hypothesis that MNP reduces prices and firms’ markups.
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Both on the demand and supply side, we find that MNP is insignificant. Although this
policy might have an effective impact in industrialized countries, the same might not be
true for developing countries. For instance, the African mobile telecommunication market
is inherently characterized by multiple SIM card ownership and the existence of dual SIM
card mobile phone devices. Hence, consumers are connected to at least two operators
with no demand for porting numbers.
In summary, our study contributes to the telecommunication demand literature. The
study specifically contributes to the literature on mobile phone service demand, switching
costs and the waterbed effect theory. Our results show that mobile phones play a signifi-
cant role in achieving social inclusion and economic development in low income countries.
We find that the introduction of mobile number portability decreases switching costs,
and increases utility that consumers derive from mobile phone services. However, on the
supply side, we find that MNP has no effect on mobile price in the selected African coun-
tries. In Chapter 3, we find elastic price elasticity of demand, while in Chapter 4, we find
inelastic price elasticity of demand for the selected African countries. This could be due
to the assumptions made in each chapter.
Our study does have limitations, which are important to emphasize to direct future
research. First, we did not consider consumer welfare and therefore, we cannot comment
on the implications of decisions taken by the regulator on whether to implement or not to
on consumer welfare. Second, our study does not measure switching costs in the African
telecommunication market. We were unable to get firm level termination rates. Hence,
the aggregation of data in Chapter 4. Due to this aggregation, the study could not
evaluate the impact of regulating termination rates on small and large mobile operators.
Understanding the impact of glide path termination rates on price on individual operators
is critical for policy. Further studies must investigate the sources of switching costs and
provide policies for reducing countering those costs. Future research must also evaluate
the effect of MNP on market concentration.
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Figure A.1: Mobile-Cellular Subscriptions by Regions
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Figure A.2: Evolution of market shares in countries with MNP between 2010-2014
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Figure A.3: Evolution of market shares in countries without MNP between 2010-2014
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Figure A.4: Mobile Prices for Selected Countries with MNP.
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Figure A.5: Mobile Prices for Selected Countries without MNP.
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